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I. INTRODUCTION
President Trump wants to deport undocumented immigrants who "have
criminal records," and are "gang members" or "drug dealers."I Since the 2016
election, immigration has dominated the headlines.2 From the President's
160 Minutes: President-Elect Trump Speaks to a Divided Country (CBS television
broadcast Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter 60 Minutes], http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-
minutes-donald-trump-fainily-melania-ivanka-lesley-stahl/ [https://perma.cc/RN36-B2YP];
Dara Lind, Donald Trump Promises To Deport 3 Million "Illegal Immigrant Criminals. "
That's Literally Impossible., Vox (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2016/11/ 14 /1 3 6 2 3004/trump-deport-million-immigrants [https://perma.cc/7U6P-99UL];
see also Madison Burga & Angelina Lerma, The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Immigration Context After the 2013 ICE Directive: Families Are Still Being Torn Apart, 42
W. ST. L. REv. 25, 49 (2014) (quoting a 2014 tweet from not-yet-President Trump in which
he criticized the Obama administration for failing to deport more undocumented migrants
who had committed crimes); Angela D. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable
Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 295, 299-300
(2017) ("Throughout his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump vowed to deport
millions of unauthorized immigrants."). See generally Yolanda Vazquez, Constructing
Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a "Post-Racial" World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599
(2015) (describing a pattern of targeting Latinos for deportation as "criminal aliens," even
while most are nonviolent).
2 See, e.g., Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Largest Deportation Campaign in US History Is
No Match for Trump 's Plan, CONVERSATION (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://theconvesaion.com/largest-deportation-campaign-in-us-history-is-no-match-for-tumps-
plan-73651 [https//permacc/XZP6-KGDR]; Lind, supra note 1; Michael D. Shear & Ron
Nixon, New Trump Deportation Rules Allow Far More Expulsions, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 21,
2017), https(//www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/us/politics/dhs-immigration-trump.html (on file
with Ohio State Law Journal) (explaining new guidelines issued by the Department of
Homeland Security with respect to deportation and, inter alia, prosecutorial discretion); 60
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"Muslim ban" to his deportation actions, the discussion about which noncitizens
are "bad" continues to consume much of the country's public policy debate.
3
In practice, the federal government uses the standard of "moral turpitude"
when determining the deportability or excludability of a noncitizen who has
committed a crime.4 This Note examines the issues involved in determining
what falls within the vague category of "crimes involving moral turpitude." The
category's vagueness is problematic for immigrants, because it fails to provide
reasonable notice to noncitizens regarding their excludability or removability
from the United States, and has the potential to allow for "arbitrary or
discriminatory law enforcement practices."5
This Note proposes a novel solution that will clarify the standard via
administrative adjudication.
Minutes, supra note 1; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST 2-4 (2017) [hereinafter HOMELAND
SECURITY], https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3469363/Frump-lmmigration-
Enforcement-Policies.pdf [https:/perma.cc/JDX8-QUAH] (directing, inter alia, changes in
immigration-related prosecutorial-discretion guidelines). The Trump administration's
efforts so far around immigration have focused on eliminating the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, decreasing the use of prosecutorial discretion, and
"build[ing] a 30-foot-high border wall that looks good from the north side." Id. at 4
(prosecutorial discretion); Associated Press, Trump Wants To Build 30-Foot-High Wall at
Mexican Border, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/19/trump-wants-to-
build-30-foot-high-wall-at-mexican-border.html [https://perma.cc/N4WZB-LSQM] (border
wall); see also Mallory Shelbourne, Staff Stopping Trump from Striking Compromise with
Dems To End Shutdown: Report, HILL (Jan. 22, 2018),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/370054-staff-stopping-trmp-from-stiking-
compromise-with-dems-to-end [https://perma.cc/T7H2-B7PX] (describing compromise
negotiations over the status of former DACA recipients and border-security measures). See
generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Department of Homeland Security's Program of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), 17 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2016).
3 See, e.g., Associated Press, Trump Threatens Mexico over 'Bad Hombres,'POLITICO
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02trump-threatens-mexicover-bad-hombre
s-234524 [https://perma.cc/E2MW-CVHV] (discussing which immigrants, in the President's
opinion, are "bad"); Editors, The Travel-Ban Do-Over, NAT'L REV. (Mar. 7, 2017),
http//www.nationalreview.com/article/445543/tmmp-travelan-new-executive-order-clarified-im
proved [https://perma.cc/3RQ6-48RA] ("The Trump administration's revised [travel-ban]
executive order ... is ... what the White House should have done from the beginning.");
Mark Hanrahan, Trump Travel Ban: Girl Guides of Canada Axes All Trips to US.,
NBCNEWS (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-travel-ban-girl-
guides-canada-cancels-all-trip-u-n73 3 161 [https://perma.cc/4SCU-KDEM] (outlining the
"travel ban" and describing one example of its practical consequences); see also, e.g.,
HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 2, at 4 (implementing, in part, President Trump's views
on the general issue of criminal law and immigration).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731,
735-38 (4th Cir. 2017) (example of application).
5 Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 Wis.
L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2016); see also Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of Moral
Turpitude": A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 259-60 (2001).
5492018]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
A. Illustrating the Problem
The 2016 case of Arias v. Lynch illustrates the vagueness of the moral
turpitude standard.6 Maria Eudofilia Arias began working for Grabill Cabinet
Company in Indiana shortly after coming to the United States without
authorization in 2000.7 Her superiors at the manufacturing company called her
an "excellent employee."8 In many ways, Arias's life story in the United States
exemplifies that of a "model" undocumented immigrant.9 She always paid her
federal taxes, and appears to have lived a stable life in America.10 Arias and her
husband have been married since 1989.11 Her eldest son, age twenty-six, was
granted a reprieve from possible deportation because of the Obama
administration's DACA program. 12 Arias's two younger children hold
American citizenship.13
After a decade in this country, the federal government charged Arias with
false use of a social security number, a felony. 14 Because she arrived in the
United States without detection, her status forced her to fabricate a social
6 See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring in thejudgment) ("The concept of moral turpitude, in all its vagueness, rife with contradiction, a
fossil, an embarrassment to a modem legal system, continues to do its dirty work." (emphasis
added)). Federal circuit courts are split as to whether the false use of a social security number,
Arias's crime, is a crime involving moral turpitude. Compare Lateef v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 592 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the crime involves moral turpitude),
with Beltran-Tirado v. immigration & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding the opposite). See generally Eugene Volokh, Using a False Social Security
Number Is a Crime-but Is It a Crime 'ofMoral Turpitude'?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/26/Using-a-false-social-
security-number-is-a-crime-but-is-it-a-crime-of-moral-turpitude/?utm term=.9328e0698dlb
[https:J/perma.ce/9XQU-LFZ2] (discussing the issue and the Arias case).7 Arias, 834 F.3d at 824.
8 Id
9 d. at 824-25; cf PRESS RELEASE, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: FIXING OUR BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM So EVERYONE
PLAYS BY THE RULES (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/
fact-sheet-fixing-our-bmken-immigration-system-so-everyone-plays-rules [https://perma.cc/E2EE-
SEZF] ("Our immigration system should reward anyone who is willing to work hard and
play by the rules."); Marc A. Thiessen, Commentary: Trump Has a Soft Spot for Illegal
Immigrants, CHL. TRIB. (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commen
tary/ct-tump-illegal-imngrants-dreamers-20161220-story.html [https//perma.cc/CD4U-LRRE](suggesting that President Trump has a "soft spot" for undocumented workers who are "good
students" or "have wonderful jobs").
10 Arias, 834 F.3d at 825.
11 Id
12Id; see also Kemper, supra note 2 (explaining DACA).
13 Arias, 834 F.3d at 825.
14Id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), (a)(8) (2012) (criminal statute); Susan Pilcher
& John Newman, Are Your Clients Readyfor the ICE?, 32 VT. B.J. 40,44 (2007) (explaining
one method by which authorities are able to detect false social security numbers used by
undocumented workers and others).
550 [Vol. 79:3
551A NEW DEFINTION OF "MORAL TURPITUDE"
security number in order to work for Grabill.1 5 As a result, she was convicted of
the crime in 2010, and "sentenced to just about the lightest felony sentence one
is likely to find in modem federal practice: one year of probation and a $100
special assessment."l 6 After completing her probation, Grabill promptly rehired
Arias. 17
Subsequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) acted swiftly to deport her
in 2010.18 In response, Arias sought discretionary cancellation of her impending
removal, which may be granted to those "who have been in the United States
for at least ten years and who can show that their removal would cause
'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"' to immediate family members
who are American citizens. 19
However, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney
General cannot exercise discretion to cancel removal where the respondent has
been convicted of a "crime involving moral turpitude." 20 Unfortunately for
Arias, an immigration judge determined that her crime fell into this category. 21
The INA does not define "moral turpitude" or "crimes involving moral
turpitude," and "courts have labored for generations to provide a workable
definition" as a result.22 Arias appealed this decision to the DOJ's Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which agreed that her crime was turpitudinous. 23
After the BIA's decision, Arias appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 24
However, the framework which the BIA used to decide if Arias's offense
was turpitudinous had been struck down as violating the INA by the time her
case reached the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 25 As a result, the court
15 Arias, 834 F.3d at 825. See generally False Social Security Numbers Spark
Immigration Raids, WiLNER & O'REILLY, http://www.wilneroreilly.com/News/False-Social-
Security-Numbers-Spark-hnmigration-Raids.shtml [https//perma.cc/U3W8-RA3A] (discussing
the widespread use of false social security numbers by undocumented immigrants and the
consequences for employers).
16 Arias, 834 F.3d at 825.
I7 Id
18 Id.
1 9 1d (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)). 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1) authorizes applications
for cancellation of deportation under various circumstances.
208 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1229b(b)(1)(C); Arias, 834 F.3d at 825.
2 1 Arias, 834 F.3d at 825-26.
22 Id. at 825.
23 1d. at 826. Judge Posner, in his Arias concurrence, criticizes the use of the word
"turpitudinous," as it appears to be a made-up adjective only used in this narrow area of law.
See id at 832 (Posner, J., concurring in thejudgment) ("Who needs to talk like that? Lawyers
apparently, and they go a step further into the lexical mud by intoning an adjectival form of
'turpitude': 'turpitudinous."').24 1d at 826.
25 at 829-30. Part III.B infra details this framework and its judicial rejection. In
summary, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey mandated that the BIA follow a three-
step inquiry. Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino 1), 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 688-90 (Att'y Gen. 2008),
vacated, 26 1. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (Att'y Gen. 2015). The third step of the inquiry allowed
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remanded her case to the BIA with a directive to "consider Arias's case under
an appropriate legal framework for judging moral turpitude." 26
B. What Is Moral Turpitude?
Courts often accept that moral turpitude means something like its early
Black's Law Dictionary definition: "baseness, vileness, or depravity." 27
However, this definition seems to be of little help, as courts and scholars
routinely criticize "moral turpitude" for its vagueness. 28 Judge Posner levels
such a criticism in his Arias concurrence. 29 He says that previous court opinions
defining moral turpitude "approach gibberish," and sees Arias's circumstance
as especially sympathetic.30 Is making up a social security number to get ajob-
particularly when the employer in question calls the employee "excellent" and
adjudicators to, under certain circumstances, look beyond the "record of conviction." Id at
690. In 2014, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the third prong of that test went
beyond the unambiguous language of the INA. Silva-Trevino v. Holder (Silva-Trevino 11),742 F.3d 197, 200-06 (5th Cir. 2014). The majority of circuits hold that the Department of
Justice is entitled to Chevron deference in defining what constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude. Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Arias, 834 F.3d at
830 n.1; Silva-Trevino flat 200-06; Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2008);
see also infra Part V.E (arguing that this author's proposed solution does not violate
Chevron). But see Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When
Does Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 NYU ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 503,
506-07 (2013) (finding that such deference is not universal). See generally Chevron v. Nat'I
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (outlining what is generally known as "Chevron
deference" to executive agencies by courts); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs. 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) ("Chevron's premise is that it is for the agencies,
not courts, to fill statutory gaps.").
2 6 Arias, 834 F.3d at 830.
27Moral Turpitude, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) ("An act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and man."); see also, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 226 (1951) (citing the
same definition); Arias, 834 F.3d at 829 (same definition); Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085,
1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (same definition); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 99 S.W.2d 1079,
1084 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (using a similar definition outside of the immigration context).28 See, e.g., Arias, 834 F.3d at 836 (Poser, J., concurring in the judgment); Harms, supra
note 5, at 259-60; Koh, supra note 5, at 1177 ("[Crimes involving moral turpitude] may also
be the most confusing removal ground in the INA."); Note, Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude, 43 HARv. L. REv. 117, 120-21 (1929) (stating that the use of a moral turpitude
standard in witness impeachment "represents confused thought"); Derrick Moore, Note,
"Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude": Why the Void-for- Vagueness Argument Is Still
Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 813, 816 (2008) (arguing that the term
"crimes involving moral turpitude" in the INA is unconstitutionally void for vagueness); see
also infra Part V.A (discussing these criticisms).
29Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-36 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).
30Id at 831 ("It's difficult to make sense of ... definitions [of crimes involving moral
turpitude], which approach gibberish yet are quoted deferentially in countless modem
opinions."); id at 836 (harmlessness).
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is eager to rehire her-really the most "base, vile, or depraved" conduct that a
court can imagine?3 ' Judge Posner thinks not, and expresses his desire that the
BIA avoid using "broad categorical rules that sweep in harmless conduct." 32
C. How To Better Define Moral Turpitude
This Note proposes that the BIA adopt a revised framework for moral
turpitude that errs on the side of not sweeping in conduct that many, today,
consider relatively harmless. 33 First, in Part II, the historical reasons for the
inclusion of "crimes involving moral turpitude" in the INA are considered.
Second, in Part M, examples of confusing modern case law are discussed: Why
is cocaine possession turpitudinous, but marijuana possession is not?34 Why is
a DUI not "base, vile, or depraved," but a DUI on a suspended license is?35 Why
do nearly identical definitions of involuntary manslaughter lead to differing
conclusions about whether that crime involves moral turpitude?36 In Part IV, the
author explores the reasons why modem moral-turpitude decisions seem so odd.
Namely, the standard-used in contexts such as professional sanctions and
witness impeachment-incorporated widely held moral ideals; 37 generally,
"turpitude" related to honesty for men, and chastity for women.38 Today, courts
continue to follow nineteenth-century case law rooted in these now-outdated
standards.39 To avoid the confusion associated with following ancient, gendered
standards, the BIA should adopt a revised definition of "crimes involving moral
turpitude" that accords with modern moral sensibilities. 40 Although such a
redefinition would represent a sharp departure from previous BIA precedents,
courts should uphold the new standard as being consistent with the judicial
deference the DOJ receives.41
31 Id. at 834; see also Moral Turpitude, supra note 27.
32 Arias, 834 F.3d at 836 (Poser, J., concurring in the judgment).
33 See id at 830; infra Part V.
34 Compare State v. Major, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (S.C. 1990) (cocaine), with State v.
Harvey, 268 S.E.2d 587, 588 (S.C. 1980) (marijuana). Although other examples that are
further discussed in Part III relate more closely to federal immigration law, the marijuana-
and-cocaine dichotomy, in this author's opinion, provides a succinct illustration of moral-
turpitude jurisprudence's arbitrariness.
35 See Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1196 (B.I.A. 1999); Moral Turpitude, supra
note 27.
36 Compare Franklin, 20 1. & N. Dec. 867, 870 (B.I.A. 1994) (involved turpitude), with
Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731, 736-37 (4th Cir. 2017) (did not involve turpitude).
37 See Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REv. 1001, 1007 (2012).
3 8 1d.
39 See id. at 1018-19.
4 0 See infra Part V.D.
41 See infra Part V.E. Again, in the majority of circuits, this means Chevron deference.
See supra note 25.
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Specifically, a revised standard for moral turpitude should mandate a "yes"
answer to the following questions as necessary conditions for a finding that any
given crime involves moral turpitude:
1. Is the mens rea purposely or knowingly?
2. Is it punishable by at least five years in prison? Alternatively, is it a sex
crime; a crime of domestic violence; a violent crime that involves harm
to children, animals, or the elderly; or a hate crime? 42
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Americans widely understood the meaning of "moral turpitude" in the
nineteenth century, when the term first found its way into immigration law.43
By the middle of the twentieth century, Congress codified it in the INA without
providing a statutory definition, although the term had, by then, lost its agreed-
upon meaning.44
A. History
Historically, America had a special incentive to exclude the "worst of the
worst" among immigrantS45: More than one European country made a habit of
requiring that those with criminal convictions emigrate to America.46 These
same governments would sometimes agree to drop criminal charges in exchange
for emigration.47
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Congress took legislative
action.48 In 1875, it passed the Act of March 3, which was the first to designate
any class of aliens as excludable from the United States.49 This legislation
focused on those who had been convicted of, or received an emigration-
conditioned pardon for, a felony. 50 However, these foreign prosecutorial
42 See infra Part V.
4 3 See Harms, supra note 5, at 262 (citing Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477);
Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1017.
44See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012); Harms, supra note 5, at 261-64; Simon-Kerr,
supra note 37, at 1017-19.
4 5 Harms, supra note 5, at 260-61.
4 6 d
4 7 1d. This trend began with the British government's "policy of exporting convicts to
the colonies." STAFF OF H.R. Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR
EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM.].
President Johnson publicly objected to this practice in 1866, after roughly a century of states
regulating in this area. See Harms, supra note 5, at 261 (citing H.R. EXEC. DOC. No. 43-253,
at 75 (1874) (lodging a formal protest against pardons by foreign powers on condition of
emigration to America)).
4 8 See Harms, supra note 5, at 261 (citing Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477).4 9 Id5 0 1d.
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practices continued, and by the late 1880s, there were widespread reports that
criminal aliens remained in the country in large numbers.51 As a result, Congress
passed the Immigration Act of 1891, and in so doing, introduced the concept of
moral turpitude into immigration law. 52 Specifically, this statute made it
possible to exclude "persons who [were] convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." 53 Perhaps because of the
consensus around the meaning of what was then a relatively common term,
Congress did not define "moral turpitude" in the Act.54 In response to continuing
concerns about the presence of immigrant criminals in the United States,
Congress made the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude a criterion
for deportation (in addition to exclusion) in the Immigration Act of 1917.55
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act: Moral Turpitude Remains
Undefined
The Immigration Act of 1952 sought to stiffen the rubric for deportation,
but kept the language of the Immigration Act of 1917 Act intact. It provides that
the following individuals are excludable from the United States:
Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits
having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the
essential elements of-
(1) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or
an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime .... 56
In addition, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b) indicates that:
The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien-
51 See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 47, at 9 ("[Plaupers, contract laborers, and
convicts were entering the country in large numbers in disregard of existing
laws .... [Legislators also] expressed particular concern about the foreign encouragement
of the emigration of undesirables.").
52 Harms, supra note 5, at 262 (citing HOUSE JUDICIARY CoMM., supra note 47, at 8).
5 3 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 47, at 10.
54 1d at 10; cf Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1018-19 (discussing broad consensus in
the nineteenth century regarding the meaning of "moral turpitude"). But see, e.g., Harms,
supra note 5, at 262 (discussing a lack of relevant legislative history for the 1874 and 1891
acts); Note, supra note 28, at 118 (arguing that it was unclear whether this was a "new
criterion, or was merely a synthesis of previously recognized distinctions").
55 Annotation, What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning
of § 212(a) (9) and 241 (a) (4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. CA. § 1182(a) (9),
1251(a) (4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of
Aliens Convicted ofSuch Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480 § 2[a] (1975).
568 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of
such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense [among other possibilities,
involving moral turpitude as in the INA section quoted above]; and
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.57
In summary, the above statutes relate to deportation law in at least two
important ways. In some circumstances, the Justice Department has used this to
deport individuals pursuant to their criminal convictions.5 8 In other cases, the
Attorney General may be powerless to adjust the immigration status of some
individuals because of their convictions for certain seemingly minor crimeS. 59
In a nation with tens of millions of immigrants contributing substantially to the
American economy, these decisions come with high stakes. 60
III. MODERN CASE LAW
Modern decisions regarding moral turpitude can seem confusing.6 1 Because
these rules no longer accord with our intuitions, courts often rely on fine-grain
distinctions in mens rea requirements to guard against the possibility that
57 1d. § 1229b(b)(1).
5 8 See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951).59 See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 2016).60 CAP Immigration Team, The Facts on Immigration Today, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2014/10/23/
5 90 4 0/the-facts-on-immigration-today-3/ [https://perma.cc/HJG8-EQYH] ("The foreign-born
population consisted of 40.7 million in 2012."); George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefitsfrom Immigration, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1995) (explaining that the economic benefits of
immigration are between $7 billion and $25 billion); The Effects of Immigration on the
United States' Economy, PENN WHARTON, U. PA.: BUDGET MODEL (June 27, 2016),
http://budgetmodel.wharton.upem.edu/issue/2016/1/27/the-effects-of-immigration-on-the-united-
states-economy [https://penna.cc/8YQ9-ZEVD] (describing how evidence supports the fact
immi ants do not affect wages and actually benefit natives economically).
61 Compare Smith v. Smith, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 473, 479 (1855) ("It is easy to see that
trespass, assault, battery, and the like are not within the [category of crimes involving moral
turpitude]: while other misdemeanors, [such as bribery, extortion, theft], are properly
included."), with Arias, 834 F.3d at 826-29 (discussing the BIA's twenty-first century
holding that a relatively innocuous white-collar crime is turpitudinous), and Sotnikau v.
Lynch, 846 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that involuntary manslaughter, under
Virginia law in 2017, is not a crime involving moral turpitude). But see Beck v. Stitzel, 21
Pa. 522, 524 (1853) (indicating that moral turpitude standards are "necessarily adaptive," in
the sense that they ought to evolve over time). See generally Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at
1022-23 (discussing Smith v. Smith); id at 1019 (discussing Beck v. Stitzel).
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judges' personal moral sensibilities might play a role. 62 Courts use a
"categorical approach" in making these determinations: Judges examine
whether a particular crime can be committed without a "turpitudinous" mens
rea.63 No matter what actual actions lead to the defendant's conviction, if one
can possibly violate the applicable statute without involving moral turpitude, the
crime is categorically not one "involving moral turpitude."M The BIA's
handling of Matter of Lopez-Meza illustrates both the categorical approach and
its confusing results in the context of aggravated DUls.6 5 Here, the BIA held
that aggravated DUI was a crime involving moral turpitude because Lopez-
Meza had to knowingly drive with a suspended license in order to be
convicted.6 6 An analogy between "concealing" a driver's-license status and
committing fraud was salient to the Board's decision. 67 The 2017 case of
Sotnikau v. Lynch provides an example of a hair-splitting mens rea distinction.
68
Although previous cases held that involuntary manslaughter was a crime
involving moral turpitude, a Virginia Supreme Court decision suggesting that it
would be possible to commit the same crime while only being criminally
negligent lead to a different result. 69
62 See Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-36 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining
that certain crimes are not intuitively known to be wrongful). Compare Sotnikau, 846 F.3d
at 736 (making a fine-grain mens rea distinction), with Franklin, 20 1. & N. Dec. 867, 869-
71 (B.I.A. 1994) (making a fine-grain mens rea distinction that produced a result markedly
different from Sotnikau in the context of involuntary manslaughter).
63 See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 2012) (mandating a categorical
approach in crimes involving moral turpitude immigration cases, and indicating that most
circuits mandate this approach).
6 See id at 485; see also Sotnikau, 846 F.3d at 735 (applying the categorical approach
to involuntary manslaughter).65 Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1193-96 (B.I.A. 1999).
661d. at 1194-95; see also Marmolejo-Campos v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 922, 925-26 (9th
Cir. 2007) (finding, again, moral turpitude where a defendant was convicted of aggravated
DUI because of his knowledge of a license suspension), aff'd on reh'g sub nom. Marmolejo-
Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). But see Torres-Varela, 23 1. &
N. Dec. 78, 86 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding that Lopez-Meza was not controlling where a defendant
was convicted of aggravated DUI under Arizona law, but under a different section that did
not require a defendant know that they were under suspension in order to be convicted).
67 See Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 1193, 1195.68 Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 2017).
69 1d. This author characterizes the distinction as fine-grain because, inter alia, the mens
rea required for involuntary manslaughter in Virginia stemmed from case law, and the idea
that a finding of negligence could support a conviction was based on the inclusion of the
words "or is charged with the knowledge of [the risk that a death might result from a
particular course of conduct]" in a court opinion. Id (citing Noakes v. Commonwealth, 699
S.E.2d 284, 288 (Va. 2010)). This perhaps stands in contrast to carefully chosen mens rea
terms in some criminal statutes. Compare id., with, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.13(A)-(B) (LexisNexis 2014) (using the terms "knowingly" and "recklessly" in a
seemingly intentional way). See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174-79 (2012) (discussing the "surplusage"
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A. Courts and Agencies Emphasize How To Look for Moral Turpitude
Moral turpitude standards can be examined along two dimensions: what
must be present for a finding of moral turpitude, and how an adjudicator should
look for those elements. 70 There has been a great deal of confusion on both
fronts. 7 1 The Silva-Trevino cases lay out the recent judicial difficulties with the
"how" question. 72
In his November 2008 opinion in Silva-Trevino I, Attorney General Michael
Mukasey recognized that moral-turpitude jurisprudence consisted of a
"patchwork of different approaches across the nation." 73 He hoped to seize the
case as a unique opportunity to "establish a uniform framework for ensuring that
the [INA]'s moral turpitude provisions are fairly and accurately applied." 74 The
Attorney General felt that this new standard should "accord[] with the statutory
text [of the INA], [be] administratively workable, and further[] the policy goals
underlying the [INA]." 75 The federal circuits took different approaches, and the
BIA's pre-Silva-Trevino I policies exacerbated the confusion 76 : Typically, the
BIA would follow the version of the moral-turpitude test that was applied in the
circuit from which any given case arose. 77 Since the Silva-Trevino Iopinion, the
DOJ has had the policy goal of devising a framework that immigration judges
can apply across all cases. 78
Before Silva-Trevino I, some courts agreed that a two-step inquiry should
be used to determine whether a crime involved moral turpitude. 79 First, under
the "categorical" prong of the test, courts should look to the statute under which
the respondent was convicted.80 If the statute sub judice could not be violated
canon and suggesting in a general way that courts assume that legislators choose words
carefully).70 See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830-36 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (what); Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino 1), 24 I. & N. Dec. 687,
693-94 (Att'y Gen. 2008) (how), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (Att'y Gen. 2015).
71 See, e.g., Silva-Trevino I, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 693-94 ("how"); Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-
36 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) ("what").72 Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693-94 (summarizing the approaches of various
courts); Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino II), 742 F.3d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting
the Silva-Trevino I approach). On the other hand, a revision of moral turpitude standards that
would respond to Judge Posner's concerns in his Arias concurrence would alter what moral
turpitude means. See infra Part V.E.
73 Silva-Trevino 1, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688.
74 Id
75 Id
76 See id
7 7 Id
7 8 See id at 688-89 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)) (indicating that Attorney General Mukasey intended to use his
Silva-Trevino I opinion to accomplish this goal).
7 9 Silva-Trevino 1, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 688.8 0 Id
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without involving moral turpitude, then this prong decided the matter.81
However, if the court could conceive of a way in which the at-issue statute could
be violated without involving moral turpitude, then a second, more fact-specific
examination was undertaken. 82 There was some variation in how courts applied
each prong.83
Indeed, circuits varied considerably, even when they followed the same
general themes. 84 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, emphasized
a fairly standard application of the categorical prong.85 Other courts looked at
the "general nature" of a crime, and asked whether or not it involved moral
turpitude in "common usage." 86 Still others emphasized whether or not there
was a "realistic probability" that a crime could be committed without moral
turpitude.87 Finally, historically, some courts fell back on making a distinction
between malum in se crimes (which were held to be turpitudinous) and malum
prohibitum crimes (which were not).8 8
Attorney General Mukasey attempted to resolve these disagreements by
mandating a three-step inquiry. 89 First, adjudicators had to evaluate whether
there was a "realistic possibility" that the statute could be violated in a way that
does not involve moral turpitude." If there was such a possibility, the judge
should proceed to step two and examine the "record of conviction" to see if the
available facts could determine whether the respondent actually committed a
81 Id
82Id
83 Id
84 Compare Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (standard
categorical approach), with Marciano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022,
1025 (8th Cir. 1971) ("common usage" rule).
85 Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 456. Again, this meant looking for the least culpable way in
which to violate a statute, and determining if such a crime would necessarily include the
requisite scienter to sustain a finding of moral turpitude. See, e.g., id at 457 (finding that, in
order to violate a particular statute, a defendant had to knowingly make a false statement;
both the "knowingness" mens rea and "false" nature of the statement were salient to the
court's decision that this crime was turpitudinous).
86 See Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's
approach as following a "common usage" rule).
87 See Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 2006) (indicating
that prior to the Ninth Circuit's application of Chevron deference to the BIA with respect to
specific crimes the BIA had found to involve moral turpitude, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals would evaluate possible crimes involving moral turpitude based on a "realistic
probability" test), overruled by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc).
8 8 See Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1008, 1023 n.161; see also Serna, 20 1. & N. Dec.
579, 581 (B.I.A. 1992) (viewing the malum in se aspect of a crime as intrinsic to a finding
that such a crime involves moral turpitude).
8 9 Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino 1), 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 689-90 (Att'y Gen. 2008),
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (Att'y Gen. 2015).
9 0 Id
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crime involving moral turpitude. 9 1 Finally, if neither step one nor two resolved
the matter, the judge looked beyond the "record of conviction" to other facts in
determining if a crime involving moral turpitude was committed.92 This is the
"Silva-Trevino I standard."
In 2014, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the third prong of that
test went beyond the unambiguous language of the INA. 9 3 In this case (Silva-
Trevino Il), the court viewed the Silva-Trevino I standard as a direct attack on
its precedent. 94 The court had to determine if the term "convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude" allowed the court to look beyond the record of
conviction to additional facts that an appellee might offer.9 5 However, Congress
defined the term "conviction" as meaning a "formal judgment of guilt" in the
INA.96 In addition, the law details specific documents which comprise these
"formal judgments."9 7 Given these statutory constraints, and the force of prior
precedent, the court ruled that the DOJ exceeded its bounds by asking courts to
look beyond the record of conviction. 98
The aftermath of Silva-Trevino II left moral-turpitude law as confusing as
ever. Additional disagreement among courts emerged as the Seventh Circuit
approved the Silva-Trevino I standard. 9 Arias's case was caught in the legal
limbo as the immigration judge she first appeared before applied an outdated
version of the law: simply using the categorical approach without looking to the
record of conviction.1 00 However, after the Fifth Circuit struck Silva-Trevino I
down and the Seventh Circuit had approved the same standard, but before
Arias's case reached an appellate court, Attorney General Eric Holder directed
the BIA to devise a new moral-turpitude standard that was unambiguously
consistent with the term "conviction" as used by the INA. 0 '
9 1 Id at 690.92 Id
93 Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino 11), 742 F.3d 197, 200-06 (5th Cir. 2014).94 See id at 200 ("We have long held that, in making this determination, judges may
consider only 'the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute,' or, in the case of
divisible statutes, 'the alien's record of conviction."' (citing Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467
F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006))).
9 5 Silva-Trevino II, 742 F.3d at 200.
9 6 1d (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(A) (2012)).
9 7 Id at 200-01 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(3)(B)).
9 8 Id. at 201-03.
99 Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 717-18 (7th Cir. 2014). In Arias, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this approval of the Silva-Trevino I standard was
likely irrelevant, as the DOJ had already decided to abandon Silva-Trevino I based on the
Fifth Circuit's disapproval. See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 824, 830 (7th Cir. 2016).
Indeed, the Attorney General formally vacated the Silva- Trevino I approach in its entirety in
Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino l1l), 26 1. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (Att'y Gen. 2015).
100 Arias, 834 F.3d at 834 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).
101 Silva-Trevino III, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 554.
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B. Confusing Decisions: What Is a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude?
Although thisjudicial wrestling with how to look for moral turpitude created
a great deal of confusion in itself, case law that relied on hair-splitting
distinctions had long created seemingly odd results with respect to what specific
crimes involved moral turpitude.1 02 Again, (1) moral turpitude never gets far
away from its historical kernel of fraud, and (2) moral turpitude decisions often
rely on very fine-grain mens rea concerns.
1. The Fraud Paradigm: Aggravated DUI
For historical reasons, adjudicators often hold that fraudulent or deceptive
conduct lies "close to the core" of moral turpitude.10 3 Matter of Lopez-Meza
illustrates this paradigm.104
In Matter ofLopez-Meza, the respondent had been convicted of aggravated
DUI under Arizona law.105 The immigration judge initially concluded that since
there was no record to indicate that DUI generally was a crime involving moral
turpitude, the respondent was not removable under the INA.1 06 However, as a
majority of the BIA recognized, such an aggravated DUI conviction has an
additional mens rea element.107 The Arizona statute provides, in pertinent part,
that a conviction for aggravated DUI must be committed "while the person's
driver's license or privilege to drive is suspended, cancelled, revoked or refused,
or the person's driver's license or privilege to drive is restricted as a result of
violating § 28-692 [DUT] or under § 28-694 [involving an administrative license
suspension related to DUI]."l0 8 The majority emphasized this "culpable mental
state" in finding Lopez-Meza's conduct to be shocking to the public conscience,
because it involved "'knowingly' driving on a suspended, cancelled, or revoked
license."l 09
The dissent in Lopez-Meza found it odd that the respondent's decision to
"ignore a state administrative directive" transformed the strict-liability offense
of DUI-which all parties agreed was not a crime involving moral turpitude-
102 See infra Parts III.B.1 and I11.B.2.
103 Arias, 834 F.3d at 827 ("Despite the confusion about how to determine what moral
turpitude is, there is a consensus that fraud is close to the core of moral turpitude."); see also,
e.g., Jordan v. De George 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951) ("Without exception, federal and state
courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude.");
Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1007-08 (arguing that, at least for men, fraud and dishonesty
were historically part of the "core" of moral turpitude).
104 Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1188, 1193 (B.I.A. 1999); see also, e.g, Jordan, 341
U.S. at 227.
10 5 Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 1188-89.
1061d. at 1189.
1 07 Id. at 1194-95.
1081d (citing ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-692(A)(1), 28-697(A)(1)).
101d. at 1194-95.
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into one that involved "baseness . .. contrary to accepted moral standards."I 0
Immediately after discussing why fraud is a paradigmatic example of a crime
involving moral turpitude, the majority said that the statute's "knowing"
requirement made Lopez-Meza's crime turpitudinous.11 i The implication was
clear: These actions were very bad because they involved a person who was
hiding something, just like fraud involves a person who is hiding something.
The BIA emphasized this point in saying that the violation of a state
administrative directive "involved a baseness so contrary to accepted moral
standards that it rises to the level of a crime involving moral turpitude."ll 2 This
is a critical reason why, to the uninitiated, moral-turpitude jurisprudence looks
so odd. Without viewing fraud as a lodestone for moral turpitude, it is not at all
clear that simply doing something sneaky is morally outrageous in the same
sense that murder and rape are morally depraved crimes.113
2. Hair-Splitting Distinctions: Involuntary Manslaughter
Decisions regarding the moral-turpitude status of offenses of recklessness
and negligence can rest on hair-splitting distinctions. In the 1994 Matter of
Franklin, a Filipino woman was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in
Missouri. 114 At the time, Missouri's involuntary manslaughter statute required
"recklessness" insofar as "the convicted person must have consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that such disregard [must
have] constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise .... "115 In finding that involuntary manslaughter was a
crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA cited parts of its own conflicted
1101d. at 1196 ("simple" DUI majority conclusion); id. at 1201 (dissent agreement)(Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring and dissenting in part). Adding to the vagueness
concerns discussed ad nauseum in other literature, the BIA found a highly similar violation
of a different section of the same Arizona statute to be nonturpitudinous. Torres-Varela, 23
I. & N. Dec. 78, 85-86 (B.l.A. 2001) (examining a case in which the "aggravating" factor
was repeat convictions within a specified period of time). But see Marmolejo-Campos v.
Gonzalez, 503 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming that Lopez-Meza is still good law
where the aggravating factor is knowingly driving on a suspended license), aff'd on reh'g
sub nom. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
1 Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 1193 (Jordan discussion); id at 1194-95("knowingly" discussion).
ll2Id at 1195.
113 See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring
in the judgment) (comparing lists of turpitudinous and nonturpitudinous crimes, and stating
that "[t]he division between the two lists is arbitrary"); Milija Zivkovic, No. A017099761,
2014 WL 4966413, at *3 (B.I.A. Aug. 28, 2014) (indicating that both rape and attempted
rape are crimes involving moral turpitude); Applicant, 1998 WL 1990297, at *1 (I.N.S. Nov.
9, 1998) ("Murder is a crime involving moral turpitude in all cases."); Rivera Pagin v.
Superintendente de la Policia, 135 P.R. Dec. 789, 799 (1994) (indicating that attempted
murder is a crime involving moral turpitude).
114 Franklin, 20 1. & N. Dec. 867, 870 (B.I.A. 1994).
I15 Id. at 867.
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precedent as supporting the idea that recklessness, so defined, involved moral
turpitude, stating that "[t]his defmition of recklessness requires an actual
awareness of the risk created by the criminal violator's action."
1l 6 On the other
hand, in the 2017 case of Sotnikau v. Lynch, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that involuntary manslaughter, under Virginia law, was not a crime
involving moral turpitude.11 7 The court acknowledged Franklin, but felt that the
best-defined mens rea required for a Virginia involuntary manslaughter
conviction came in the form of the following quote from the Virginia Supreme
Court:
[A]cts of a wanton or willful character, committed or omitted, show a reckless
or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably
calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will
be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of,
the probable results of his [or her] acts.118
The court describes this as a "criminal negligence" standard, because it
requires "indifferent disregard" for others, when it is "not improbable" that
injury will result.119 In any case, because this broad, ambiguous description of
a mens rea that might be termed "negligence"-although it includes the word
"reckless" within its definition-encompassed less culpable conduct than the
Missouri statute in play in the Franklin case, the court distinguished the two.1
2 0
Although it is certainly not the only area in which moral-turpitude decisions
become murky, offenses of recklessness and negligence may occasion thorny
116Id. at 869 (quoting Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 613-14 (B.I.A. 1976), af'd sub.
nom. Medina-Luna v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Interestingly, the board quotes this conclusion from a case in which the board defined
recklessness as "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and such
disregard must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care," perhaps with the
implication that if the standard definition of recklessness does not clearly involve moral
turpitude, the same definition with several adjectives and adverbs italicized will make the
point clear. Id (quoting Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 613-14); see also Franklin v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 72 F.3d 571, 593 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bennett, J., dissenting) ("I find
that the [BIA's precedent] gives no explanation or analysis to support its conclusion that
willingness to commit an act in disregard of a perceived risk is moral turpitude . . . ."). For a
similarly "standard" definition of recklessness, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM.
LAW INST. 1985) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct."). Previously, the board had followed the rule that
"voluntary manslaughter involves moral turpitude, although involuntary manslaughter does
not." Lopez, 13 1. & N. Dec. 725, 726 (B.I.A. 1971) (calling this rule "well settled"); see
also Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene 316, 318 (Iowa 1851) (suggesting that there may be various
instances in which homicides are not crimes involving moral turpitude).117 Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 2017).
1 8 1d. at 736 (citing Noakes v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 284, 288 (Va. 2010)).
119 Id
120 Compare id, with Franklin, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 870.
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distinctions. In other cases, courts may focus on analogizing elements of
criminal statutes to fraud. 12 1 And, of course, there has been a great deal of
disagreement, in fairly recent history, regarding how adjudicators ought to look
for moral turpitude. 12 2
IV. HISTORICAL CASE LAW: EXPLAINING WHY TODAY'S STANDARDS
ARE So CONFUSING
So, how did moral-turpitude law become so counterintuitive? Why do
today's decisions about what is a "crime involving moral turpitude" seem to
bear little relationship to what twenty-first-century Americans regard as "base,
vile, or depraved?" 23 Professor Julia Ann Simon-Kerr offers one compelling
explanation 24 : "Moral turpitude," in the nineteenth century, related to widely-
held, gendered honor-culture norms. 12 5 Specifically, Americans prized honesty
in men, and chastity in women.126 Today, courts apply stare decisis to moral-
turpitude decisions by continuing to hold that any specific crime is turpitudinous
so long as a previous case recognizes it as such. 127 Thus, courts create a body of
moral-turpitude law in which nineteenth-century honor-culture norms are
calcified in modern precedent.1 28
A. Moral Turpitude's First Appearance: Brooker v. Coffin
A New York court first used the phrase "moral turpitude" in determining
what conduct may constitute slander per se. 129 Here, the defendant accused the
plaintiff of being a "common prostitute." 1 30 In determining that these words, in
themselves, were not actionable, the court emphasized that the statute which
covered prostitution at the time in New York, a broad provision aimed towards
various types of disorderly conduct, also described behavior such as
12 1 See supra Part III.B.1.
122 See supra Part III.A.
123 Compare Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring
in the judgment) (comparing lists of turpitudinous and nonturpitudinous crimes, and stating
that "[t]he division between the two lists is arbitrary"), with Moral Turpitude, supra note 27.
124 Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1007.
125_1d
126 Id
127 Compare, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951), with, e.g., Lopez-
Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1188, 1191 (B.I.A. 1999).
128 Compare, e.g., Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227, with, e.g., Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. at
1191.
12 9 Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). Moral turpitude continues
to be linked to the perceived reputational harm stemming from a criminal accusation in
defamation law today. See, e.g., Ne. Ohio Elite Gymnastics Training Ctr., Inc. v. Osborne,
916 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander§§ 141, 212 (2017) (discussing defamation per se).
130 Brooker, 5 Johns. at 188.
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"physiognomy, palmistry, [and] pretending to tell fortunes" as within its
ambit. 13 1 In the opinion of the court, since these acts were not ones of "moral
turpitude," accusing someone of violating any part of the statute would not
constitute slanderous words without a showing of an injury. 132 However, one
dissenting judge wrote that the defendant's words, "besides imputing great
moral turpitude, and tending to render the person odious in the opinion of
mankind, may ... also subject the [plaintiff] to a[] . . . disgraceful
punishment."1 33 From this very first instance of moral turpitude in the law, two
key themes emerge: it is concerned with reputational harm, viewed through the
prism of nineteenth-century honor-culture norms; and, no one can agree on what
it means.
B. The Early Evolution of the Moral Turpitude Standard
In the decades following Brooker, the "moral turpitude" standard came to
be used in rules regarding the "the disbarment of attorneys, revocation of
physicians' licenses .. . and credibility of witnesses."1 34 Although there have
always been marginal cases involving controversial moral-turpitude
determinations, the standard came into more widespread use because it captured
certain moral sentiments that were widely shared by the community. 135
1. Moral Turpitude's Roots in Gendered Honor Culture
In her article Moral Turpitude, Professor Simon-Kerr argues that when
"moral turpitude" entered the legal lexicon, Americans generally agreed on what
it meant. 13 6 People used the phrase in everyday life, and it corresponded to those
acts which might bring one the most reputational harm: for women, this meant
promiscuity, and for men, it meant oath-breaking. 137 Indeed, oath-keeping
honor culture was the dominant zeitgeist of political and business elites in the
nineteenth century.1 38 The opposite of truthful, honorable conduct was "moral
1 3 1 Id. at 191.132 1d. at 189.
133 Id at 190 (Sedgwick, J., dissenting).
134 Harms, supra note 5, at 272.
135 See Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1007.
136Id.
137 Id
138 See id at 1012-13; see also Mark M. Carroll, "All for Keeping His Own Negro
Wench": Birch v. Benton (1858) and the Politics ofSlander and Free Speech in Antebellum
Missouri, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 835, 858 (2011) ("The model for praiseworthy manhood in
antebellum Missouri was Andrew Jackson, whose mother summed up its essence with the
colloquial advice, 'Never tell a lie, nor take what is not your own, nor sue anybody for slander
or assault and battery. Always settle them cases yourself.' . . . The vindication of personal
honor .. . frequently prompted common men and politicians to respond to political insults
with lethal violence."). This attitude is further exemplified by an exchange between
Representative Samuel Untermeyer and J.P. Morgan while Mr. Morgan was testifying before
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turpitude."' 39 And, in a young country that lacked many universal norms-
where "reputation was the glue that held the polity together"-being a person
of moral turpitude was a pretty bad thing. 14 0 Professor Simon-Kerr notes that
the founding fathers particularly admired Cicero; 14 1 as such, perhaps the
intellectual elite of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century would have
been inclined to heed words such as these: "[T]he dishonesty of an action
is .. . in itself execrable and frightful... . [A]s virtue or moral excellency is for
itself to be valued and desired, so vice or moral turpitude is to be hated and
avoided." 1 42
2. Early Case Law: Contrasting Homicide and Commercial Crimes
The 1851 Iowa case of Burton v. Burton exemplifies the connection between
moral turpitude and a man's commercial reputation. 143 In this slander case, in
which the state's supreme court applied the rule of Brooker v. Coffin, the
defendant was accused of having poisoned a neighbor's cow. 144 The Burton
court referred to the Brooker moral-turpitude standard as a "well-defined rule,"
and thought that it very clear that cow poisoning was a turpitudinous offense,
given that its commission would "impute[] to the plaintiff a degree of moral
turpitude which would render him disgraceful and morally infamous in the
the House Banking and Currency Committee. WILLIAM W. BAKER, ENDLESS MONEY: THE
MORAL HAZARDS OF SOcIALISM 278-79 (2010). In response to Representative Untermeyer's
question, "Is not commercial credit based upon money or property?" Morgan replied that a
man gets a loan "on character ... [bjecause a man I do not trust could not get money from
me on all the bonds in Christendom." Id. This way of viewing the world stands in contrast
to today's discourse, in which even antifeminists accept as given that male violence is a bad
thing. See, e.g., Frank Miniter, The Hard Adrenaline-Soaked Truth About "Toxic
Masculinity," FORBES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/frankminiter/2017/01/
18/the-hard-adrenaline-soaked-truth-about-toxic-masculinity/2/#88aa2f744ccc [https://per
ma.cc/4C2C-UVS8] ("Man's caveman traits, [some feminists wrongly] argue, run toxic with
adrenaline unless our young men can swear off being men ."); see also Kali Holloway, Toxic
Masculinity Is Killing Men: The Roots of Male Trauma, SALON (June 12, 2015),
http://www.salon.com/2015/06/12/toxicmasculinity is killing men the roots of male t
rauma_partner/ [https://perma.cc/3UGK-63BU] (discussing "toxic masculinity" in general).139 Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1011.
140 Id (citing JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 69 (2001)).
141 Id
1421d (citing 3 CICERO, DE FINIBus 158 (Jeremy Collier ed., Samuel Parker trans.,
1812)).
143 Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene 316, 318 (Iowa 1851); see Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at
1018 (discussing the case). The author's selection of historical case law, throughout this Part,
owes a great deal to Professor Simon-Kerr's selection of cases. See id
144 Burton, 3 Greene at 316-17 ("In [Brooker v. Coffin] it is held, that if the charge,
being true, will subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral
turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment, then the words will be in themselves
actionable.").
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estimation of all worthy neighbors and citizens."1 45 Importantly, the court found
this more turpitudinous than homicide, because homicides may occur in the
"heat of sudden passion."1 4 6 And, given that "many circumstances may exist as
palliations of moral guilt in the public mind [with respect to homicide]; but no
circumstances can possibly extenuate the moral turpitude of that wretch who
will poison his neighbor's horse or cow," the court thought it obvious that cow
poisoning involved greater moral turpitude.1 4 7
3. Early Case Law: Violence Is Not So Bad
Many early moral-turpitude cases stand for the proposition that-at least for
men-violent offenses do not occasion such reputational damage as to be
turpitudinous, but that any conduct that might erode trust does.
14 8 In Smith v.
Smith, an 1858 case from the Tennessee Supreme Court, it was determined that
trespass, assault, and battery were not crimes involving moral turpitude, while
bribery, extortion, theft, keeping a bawdy house, financial corruption, and
selling liquor to slaves, were certainly crimes involving moral turpitude.1
49
Though these distinctions might today seem wildly counterintuitive, at the time,
they were widely agreed upon. 50 As such, moral turpitude served a clear policy
purpose: it placed those offenses which caused the most reputational harm,
based on a widely shared consensus, into a particular legal category, for
purposes of adjudicating slander cases which concerned reputation.is5 It makes
sense, then, that authorities imported moral turpitude into other realms:
professional licensure, witness impeachment, and juror disqualification. 52 As
originally conceived, moral turpitude helped to pick out both the worst among
us, and the least honest among us; thus, the standard was particularly well suited
to each of these contexts.
145d at 317-18.
1461d at 318.
147 Id.
14 8 See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
149 Smith v. Smith, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 473, 479-83 (1855); see also Simon-Kerr, supra
note 37, at 1022-23 (discussing the case).
150 See supra Part IV.B.1.
151 Cf supra Part IV.B.1.
152See Christopher J. McFadden et al., Preservation of Error with Regard to the Jury
Selection Process-Generally, in GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 9.3 (2017);
H.D.W., Annotation, What Offenses Involve Moral Turpitude Within Statute Providing
Grounds for Denying or Revoking License of Dentist, Physician, or Surgeon, 109 A.L.R.
1459, 1459-64 (1937); R.E.H., Annotation, Impeachment of Witness by Expert Evidence
Tending To Show Mental or Moral Defects, 15 A.L.R. 932, 932-36 (1921). Indeed, moral
turpitude is still used as a criterion for witness impeachment in some states. See STEVEN
GOODE & OLIN GUY WELLBORN, COURTROOM EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 12-13 (2016-2017
Student ed. 2016); George Blum et al., Necessity that Felony Involve Moral Turpitude, 21A
CAL. JUR. 3D CRIMINAL LAW: TRIAL § 767 (2017).
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4. The Creation ofan Important Precedent: Jordan v. De George
In 1951, just before the passage of the INA, the Supreme Court decided the
seminal moral turpitude case of Jordan v. De George.153 De George was twice
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled
spirits.1 54 The defendant had lived in the United States for twenty-nine years,
and his wife and children were all American citizens.155 After appealing his
deportation order over a five-year period beginning in 1946, the Supreme Court
finally pronounced him removable. 156 The Court found it critical that-up to
that point--"[i]n every deportation case where fraud has been proved, federal
courts have held that the crime in issue involved moral turpitude." 5 7 Because
of the "contaminating component" of fraud in his conspiracy to deprive the
federal government of revenue, the Court deemed this crime turpitudinous.s58
In subsequent immigration-court and appellate cases, fraud, deceit, and virtually
all forms of dishonesty and concealment have been treated as paradigmatic
examples of moral turpitude;1 59 Jordan v. De George continues to be cited in
many of these opinions.1 60
V. A SOLUTION
The moral turpitude standard in immigration law has long ceased to serve
the policy function for which it was originally conceived. Rather than
continuing to evolve as the American public's moral sentiments have changed,
moral-turpitude decisions have led courts to calcify outdated ethical norms injudicial precedent.161 Judges and administrators closely adhere to moral-
1 53 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951).
1 54 Id at 224-25.
15 5 Id at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1 56 Id. at 225-26 (majority opinion).
1 57 Id at 227. The offenses the Court cites for this proposition include: "obtaining goods
under fraudulent pretenses; conspiracy to defraud by deceit and falsehood; forgery with
intent to defraud; using the mails to defraud; execution of chattel mortgage with intent to
defraud; concealing assets in bankruptcy; [and] issuing checks with intent to defraud." Id. at
228 (citations omitted).
1 5 8 Id at 229.
159See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Despite the confusion
about how to determine what moral turpitude is, there is a consensus that fraud is close to
the core of moral turpitude.").
1 60 See, e.g., id; Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 481 (4th Cir. 2012); Ali v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008); Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1188, 1191 (B.I.A. 1999);
In re Ramos, 326 P.3d 826, 831 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
161 Compare, e.g., Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231 (concluding that "difficulty in determining
whether certain marginal offenses [were] within the meaning of the language" did not render
the statute unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, the meaning of moral turpitude was
sufficiently definite to withstand scrutiny), with, e.g., Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1191(stating that since Jordan, courts have referred to moral turpitude as a "'nebulous concept'
with ample room for differing definitions"). But see Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. 522, 524 (1853)
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turpitude precedents-insofar as they concern specific crimes-because closely
following such precedent limits the appearance that courts are simply applying
judges' individualized senses of morality. 162 It would seem imprudent-or in
any event unlikely-for judges to suddenly break with this practice, and begin
explicitly deciding moral-turpitude cases based on what they, personally, view
as "base[], vile[], or deprav[ed]." 163
Of course, there are other possible ways to resolve the moral-turpitude
problem, and this Note begins by presenting this author's novel solution in
contrast to those.16 First, some have proposed that the United States Supreme
Court find the term "moral turpitude" to be void for vagueness. 165 While other
authors make compelling arguments on this front, this solution would itself
require an upending of an oft-cited precedent, Jordan v. De George.1
66
Additionally, this judicial solution would simply remove the moral-turpitude
standard from the INA without providing a workable replacement, and could
not be implemented as quickly as an administrative one. 167 Others have
proposed a legislative solution' 68 : that Congress should provide a definition of
"crimes involving moral turpitude" in the INA.1 69 However, Congress has been
wrought with gridlock in recent years. 170 And, even in a time when Republicans
control both the House and Senate, the redefinition would have to clear several
(indicating that moral turpitude standards are "necessarily adaptive," in the sense that they
ought to evolve over time); Simon-Kerr, supra note 37, at 1019 (discussing Beck). The author
offers support for this Note's contentions regarding modem moral sentiments below in terms
of public-and broadly speaking, emotional-reactions to wrongdoing. One of the strengths
of the metaethical paradigm of moral sentimentalism is its ability to "mak[e] sense of the
practical aspects of morality." Moral Sentimentalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 29,
2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-sentimentalism [https://permacd/6WWL-58JM1;
see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 457 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed.
1978) ("Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly
impotent in this particular."). See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (1759) (outlining a version of this paradigm).
1 6 2 See Harms, supra note 5, at 276 n.147.
163 Moral Turpitude, supra note 27.
164 See infra Part V.A.
165 See Moore, supra note 28, at 814; see also Koh, supra note 5, at 1127; infra
Part V.A.2.
166 See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229 ("But it has been suggested that the phrase 'crime
involving moral turpitude' . . . is .. . unconstitutional for vagueness. Under this view, no
crime, however grave, could be regarded as falling within the meaning of the term 'moral
turpitude."'); Moore, supra note 28, at 833.
16 7 See ELIZABETH C. RICHARDSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 15 (1996)
("Agencies can generally move faster than courts .. .").
168 See Harms, supra note 5, at 260; see also infra Part V.A.].
169 See Harms, supra note 5, at 260.
170 See Martin Nie & Christopher Barns, The Fiftieth Anniversary ofthe Wilderness Act:
The Next Chapter in Wilderness Designation, Politics, and Management, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 237, 276-77 (2014) ("[C]ongressional gridlock has simply pushed some policy
issues and disputes onto alternative decision-making paths ... [including] executive branch
intervention . . . .").
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veto-gates, including a potential Democratic filibuster. 171 In any case, an
administrative solution, as Judge Posner suggests in his Arias concurrence, has
the virtue of relatively rapid implementation. 172
As a result, this Note proposes that the BIA adopt a definition of what moral
turpitude is. While the DOJ's previous efforts in the Silva-Trevino cases have
dealt with how adjudicators ought to look for moral turpitude, Judge Posner
accurately suggests that a serious solution that resolves moral-turpitude
jurisprudence's most grave issues must deal with what the concept itself
entails.1 73 This Note proposes that "yes" answers to the following questions be
necessary conditions for a finding that any given crime involves moral turpitude:
1. Is the mens rea purposely or knowingly?
2. Is it punishable by at least five years in prison? Alternatively, is it a sex
crime; a crime of domestic violence; a violent crime that involves harm
to children, animals, or the elderly; or a hate crime?
To be consistent with Judge Posner's prescription that the BIA use rules that
avoid sweeping in "harmless conduct," the DOJ ought to prefer a bright-line
rule for determining what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.1 74 More
specifically, these factors result from several basic propositions about twenty-
first century ethical norms and moral-turpitude law. For one, as Franklin and
Sotnikau illustrate, moral-turpitude determinations involving offenses of
recklessness and negligence are often so hair-splitting as to be arbitrary.17 5
1 7 1 See Mark Z. Barabak & Lisa Mascaro, Republicans Hold the House and Senate, but
Will That End the Washington Gridlock Even with President Trump?, L.A. TIMEs (Nov. 9,
2016), http://www.Iatimes.com/politics/a-na-pol-election-congress-control-20161108-story.html
[httpsi/perma.cc/3SET-V9AA] (Republican control); Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim,
McConnell Warns Trump To Back Off on Killing Filibuster, POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2017),http[//www.politico.com/story/2017/01/mitch-meconnell-tmmp-filbuster-234293 [https//permacc
/W6HH-39YF] (indicating that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell does not support
ending the filibuster). See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster,
49 STAN. L. REv. 181 (1997) (describing the filibuster).172 See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830-36 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring in
the judgment) (suggestion); RICHARDSON, supra note 167, at 15 ("[A]gencies are efficient
when you consider how long it would take Congress or even a court to respond . . . ."). To
be clear, Judge Posner himself suggests administrative action, but does not expound on the
virtues of administrative efficiency. See Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-36 (Posner, J., concurring in
the judgment).
1 73 See Arias, 834 F.3d at 836 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he [BIA's]
congressional mandate [under the INA] is to identify crimes that are morally reprehensible
and thus a proper ground for deportation."); see also Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino l1l), 26 I.
& N. Dec. 550, 554 (Att'y Gen. 2015) (DOJ efforts); Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino I), 24 I.
& N. Dec. 687, 688-90 (Att'y Gen. 2008) (DOJ efforts), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554(Att'y Gen. 2015).
174 See Arias, 834 F.3d at 836 (Poser, J., concurring in the judgment); infra Part V.C.175 See Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731, 735-37 (4th Cir. 2017); Franklin, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 867, 867 (B.I.A. 1994); supra Part III.B.2 (discussing cases). Even if the distinctions
between involuntary manslaughter law in Missouri and Virginia are not arbitrary in the sense
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Second, modern Americans regard violence as being quite serious in nature,
whereas their nineteenth-century forebears did not. 176 Additionally, Westerners
find the victimization of vulnerable people, including sex crimes, to be morally
reprehensible. 177 Finally, in any case, sentencing standards and offense
gradation, in the twenty-first century, relate to how seriously Americans regard
any particular crime.1 78 The BIA is best positioned to move forward with this
redefinition of moral turpitude because it (1) can act relatively quickly and
decisively, and (2) generally receives Chevron deference with respect to its
definition of moral turpitude. 179 This Note concludes by arguing that this
author's proposed moral-turpitude redefinition should be upheld by courts under
various schemes of deference.180
A. Contrasting Judicial and Legislative Proposals
Again, legislative and judicial solutions lack the swiftness of an
administrative change.1 81 However, both Professor Brian Harms and Derrick
Moore offer compelling legislative and judicial solutions, respectively.1 82
Professor Harms details a congressional redefinition of "crimes involving moral
turpitude" based on what he terms a "listing method plus." 183 Mr. Moore
outlines the arguments for a judicial finding that "crimes involving moral
turpitude" is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 184
1. Congress Could Redefine Moral Turpitude
In his 2001 article Redefining "Crimes ofMoral Turpitude ": A Proposal to
Congress, Professor Brian Harms articulates a legislative fix for moral turpitude
that courts use "arbitrary" in constitutional void-for-vagueness law, it seems dubious that the
fine-grain legal distinctions elicited in these cases relate to what Missourians and Virginians
regard as base, vile, or depraved. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussion of cases); infra Part
V.A.2 (void for vagueness). Is it true that Missourians think involuntary manslaughter to be
a "vile" offense, while Virginians think that it is not? The author doubts this.
17 6 See infra Part V.D.2 (violence today); supra Part IV.B.2 (violence in the nineteenth
century).
1 7 7 See infra Part V.D.2.
1 7 8 See infra Part V.D.3.
1 79 See RICHARDSON, supra note 167, at 15 (quick action); infra Part V.E (Chevron); see
also Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) (Chevron).
180 1nfra Part V.E. Again, some circuits apply non-Chevron schemes of deference to the
BIA's determinations of whether a given crime involves moral turpitude. E.g., Smalley v.
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2003) ("First, we accord 'substantial deference to
the BIA's interpretation of the INA' and its definition of the phrase 'moral turpitude.'
Second, we review de novo whether the elements of a state or federal crime fit the BIA's
definition of a [crime involving moral turpitude]." (citation omitted)).
181 See RICHARDSON, supra note 167, at 15.
182 See Harms, supra note 5, at 260; Moore, supra note 28, at 816.
183 Harms, supra note 5, at 279.
184 Moore, supra note 28, at 816.
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law.185 He begins by drawing on several sources which argue that the current
state of moral-turpitude decisions can best be understood as falling into four
categories: "(1) crimes against the person; (2) crimes against property; (3) sex
crimes and crimes involving family relationships; and (4) crimes of fraud
against the government or its authority." 8 6 Although courts often do not draw
on these distinctions as decision-making frameworks, they offer some clarity in
describing the body of moral-turpitude law. 18 7 Crimes against the person are
found to "involve moral turpitude when the local statute .. . requires 'malicious
intent.'"18 8 As a result, murder, inter alia, is always a crime involving moral
turpitude.1 89 Crimes against property "involve moral turpitude if the . .. statute
requires an intent to deprive, defraud, or destroy."l 90 Sex crimes and crimes
involving family relationships are a bit more difficult to succinctly
characterize. 19 1 Rape, for instance, as an "aggravated" sex crime, always
involves moral turpitude.1 92 On the other hand, those sex crimes which courts
consider nonaggravated, such as vagrancy, are not turpitudinous.1 93 Crimes of
fraud against the government or its authority, such as unlawful use of the mails,
are considered exemplary crimes involving moral turpitude in all cases. 194
Professor Harms considers that, if Congress were to delineate "crimes
involving moral turpitude" in statute, it could take one of three approaches.1 95
First, legislators could choose the "listing method," which is what it sounds like:
simply creating lists of turpitudinous and nonturpitudinous crimes.1 96 For
instance, "crimes of fraud against the government or its authority," or murders,
would always be crimes involving moral turpitude, per an explicit directive in
an amended INA.1 97 Of course, this would maximize notice to the public, but
would offer minimal flexibility.1 98 In fact, it would likely depend on the notion
that a complete list of crimes might be ascertainable with certainty, and would
require future legislators to decide whether every new federal, state, or local
crime in the United States belonged in the "basket of turpitude" or not.19 9
1 8 5 Harms, supra note 5, at 260.
1 86 Id at 267-69.
187Id; see, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 823-30 (7th Cir. 2016) (failing to use
this as a decision-making framework).
1 88 Harms, supra note 5, at 267-68.
189 Id
190Id at 268.
19 1 See id. at 268-69.
192Id at 268.
193 Id at 269. Family law, although Professor Harms places it in this category, is a bit
more haphazard: "adultery, abortion, bigamy, spousal abuse, and child abuse" have been
held to be crimes involving moral turpitude, while bastardy has not. Id
194 Harms, supra note 5, at 269.
19 5 1d at 278-79.
196Id at 279-80.
197 Id. at 267-70 (type of crime); id at 279-80 (method).
19 8 See id. at 279-80.
1 9 9 See id at 280.
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Second, Congress could simply codify the current common law of moral
turpitude. 200 While this "generally accepted principles" approach provides
minimal notice, it would have the arguable virtue of preserving current judicial
flexibility. 20 1 Ultimately, Professor Harms recommends that Congress use what
he calls the "listing method plus," specifically detailing which crimes are crimes
involving moral turpitude, which are not, and setting up a clearer framework for
those that are not in either category. 202
2. The Supreme Court Could Find That Moral Turpitude Is Void for
Vagueness
In a 2008 note in the Cornell International Law Journal, Derrick Moore
argues that the void-for-vagueness argument is meritorious.2 03 Importantly,
sixteen years after Jordan, the Supreme Court clarified that the vagueness
doctrine could apply to noncriminal statutes in Keyishian v. Board ofRegents.2 04
Further, Moore cites at least three reasons why Jordan could be read
narrowly. 20 5 First, Jordan is amenable to the interpretation that it is only binding
on "'easy' fraud" cases. 206 Again, fraud is a paradigmatic example of moral
turpitude.20 7 Since De George committed an offense of fraud against the
government, it made more sense to find that he was on notice that his conduct
was turpitudinous, as it had been turpitudinous since the nineteenth century.
2 08
Secondly, the void-for-vagueness argument is raised sua sponte, and in response
to Justice Jackson's dissent.209 Here, Moore cites Professors Adam A. Milani
and Michael R. Smith's work criticizing sua sponte decisions generally;
2 10
importantly, Professors Milani and Smith argue that such decisions should be
accorded less precedential weight, as courts do not consider them as fully
200 Harms, supra note 5, at 280-81.
201 Id
202Id at 281-83.
2 03 Moore, supra note 28, at 816. Professor Jennifer Lee Koh discusses the void-for-
vagueness doctrine's possible application throughout immigration law, including moral
turpitude law, in Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine. Koh, supra note 5.
The author has chosen Moore's note to summarize as a possible alternative because of
Moore's narrower focus on crimes involving moral turpitude. See Moore, supra note 28, at
816.
204Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967); Moore, supra note 28, at
834.
205 Moore, supra note 28, at 815-16.
206 1d. at 835-36.
207 Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[T]here is a consensus that fraud
is close to the core of moral turpitude.").
208 See Moore, supra note 28, at 815-16.
2091d at 836-37.
210 Id. at 837 (citing Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God A CriticalLook
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REv. 245, 251 (2002)).
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relative to issues that parties brief and argue.2 11 Finally, Moore cites some of
the alleged flaws in the majority opinion alluded to above. 2 12 Chief Justice
Vinson, writing for the Court, calls moral turpitude a "deep root[ed]" concept,
since it had, at that point, been in immigration law for about sixty years. 2 13
However, Justice Jackson, writing in dissent, finds this characterization
disingenuous, as courts and scholars had already recognized the term's
ambiguities.2 14 Additionally, the Jordan majority fails to explicitly connect the
void-for-vagueness doctrine with the concept of notice, an underlying policy
concern that has been more fully developed as a component of the doctrine in
subsequent years.2 15 The doctrine's availability outside of the criminal context,
Jordan's narrow reading, and moral turpitude's widely recognized vagueness
arguably offer the judicial branch an opportunity to strike down the INA's
reliance on moral turpitude as too ambiguous. 2 16
Professor Harms and Mr. Moore each offer compelling solutions that would
address significant problems with moral turpitude. However, neither achieves
the rapid implementation of an administrative solution; 2 17 further, while ajudicial finding of void for vagueness might constitute a first step towards
resolving the problem, it still would not answer the question: What is the sort of
morally reprehensible conduct for which someone ought to be excluded from
the United States?2 18 As a result, this Note urges the BIA to follow Judge
Posner's suggestion in Arias, and redefine what "moral turpitude" means.219
2 11 See Milani & Smith, supra note 210, at 251; Moore, supra note 28, at 837. Professors
Milani and Smith cite at least three things that appellate courts often fail to do with respect
to sua sponte issues, which ought to be best practices: "request supplemental briefs and
arguments from counsel," "grant the losing party's request for rehearing," and indicate that
subsuent courts should accord the sua sponte issue "less deference." Id2 1 Moore, supra note 28, at 837-39.
213 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951); Moore, supra note 28, at 837-38.214 Jordan, 341 U.S. at 243-44 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Moore, supra note 28, at 837.215 See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 223-32; Moore, supra note 28, at 838. Further, arguably, the
Court was precluded from considering the void-for-vagueness issue in Jordan, since the
issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari. See Moore, supra note 28, at 838-39.216 Moore, supra note 28, at 813-16, 828.2 17 Cf RICHARDSON, supra note 167, at 15 (describing agencies as quicker at handling
problems).2 18 See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 836 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring in thejudgment) ("[T]he [BIA's] congressional mandate [under the INA] is to identify crimes that
are morally reprehensible and thus a proper ground for deportation.").2 19 See id This author reads Judge Posner's Arias concurrence as suggesting that the
BIA should adopt a construction of "crimes involving moral turpitude" that he would deem
more reasonable. However, it should be acknowledged that Judge Posner is not so explicit
as to suggest that the DOJ initiate this change via adjudication. This Note, though, aspires to
devise a construction of the term that would satisfy his concerns.
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B. Emphasizing the "What" over the "How"
The BIA's previous attempts at addressing problems in moral-turpitude
decision-making, in the Silva-Trevino cases, centered on questions of how to
look for moral turpitude; 220 in his Arias concurrence, Judge Posner urges the
BIA to resolve the "what" question that lies at the heart of the problem.221 Judge
Posner, like many, criticizes the bizarre juxtapositions between crimes that are
and are not ones of moral turpitude.222 He offers the following list from the
DOJ's handbook as one that is particularly confusing 223:
220 Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino 1), 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 687 (Att'y Gen. 2008), vacated,
26 1. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (Att'y Gen. 2015); Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino III), 26 1. & N.
Dec. 550, 550 (Att'y Gen. 2015).
221 See Arias, 834 F.3d at 836 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Tihe [BIA's]
congressional mandate [under the [NA] is to identify crimes that are morally reprehensible
and thus a proper ground for deportation.").
222Id at 833.
2 2 3 Id (citing U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 9 FAM 40.21(a) N2.3-
2).
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Crimes Involving Moral
Turnitude:
(1) Bribery;
(2) Counterfeiting;
(3) Fraud against revenue or other
government functions;
(4) Mail fraud;
(5) Perjury;
(6) Harboring a fugitive from justice
(with guilty knowledge); and
(7) Tax evasion (willful).
Table I
Crimes Not Involving Moral
Turpitude:
(1) Black-market violations;
(2) Breach of the peace;
(3) Carrying a concealed weapon;
(4) Desertion from the Armed
Forces;
(5) Disorderly conduct;
(6) Drunk or reckless driving;
(7) Drunkenness;
(8) Escape from prison;
(9) Failure to report for military
induction;
(10) False statements (not
amounting to perjury or
involving fraud);
(11) Firearms violations;
(12) Gambling violations;
(13) Immigration violations;
(14) Liquor violations;
(15) Loan sharking;
(16) Lottery violations;
(17) Possessing burglar tools
(without intent to commit
burglary);
(18) Smuggling and customs
violations (where intent to
commit fraud is absent);
(19) Tax evasion (without intent to
defraud); and
(20) Vagrancy.
-'I
In examining the two lists, some themes do emerge: Crimes involving moral
turpitude tend to have higher mens rea standards, and have more obvious
connections to fraud and dishonesty. 22 4 Despite this, Judge Posner sees the list
as confounding.225 As he puts it, "[t]he first is open-ended and therefore
provides incomplete guidance on how to avoid committing a crime of moral
turpitude against the government. The second list ... includes a number of
crimes that are as serious ... as those in the first list ... ."226 Of course, Judge
Posner is not alone in his opinion that crimes involving moral turpitude and
2 2 4 See id
225 Id.
226 
_1d
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crimes not involving moral turpitude often seem equally serious.
2 27 The
explanation for this is simple: Our modem moral sentiments no longer accord
with those notions of moral turpitude that have hardened into judicial
precedent. 22 8
C. How To Avoid Sweeping in Harmless Conduct: Use a Bright-Line
Rule
Ad hoc tests have a downside: they can be unfair.229 Critics of moral-
turpitude standards make this point routinely.230 Why do aggravated DUls
involve moral turpitude, but other DUls do not?23 1 Why is cocaine possession
turpitudinous, but marijuana possession is not?23 2 In part, the ad hoc nature of
current moral-turpitude standards explains this: Judges are free-within
sometimes tight precedential constraints-to apply their own moral sense to
each case.233 And, when judges apply their own moral sense in making
decisions, they may treat individuals unfairly; the crimes that seem really bad to
onejudge will be not so bad to another, and which way any individual case goes
will rest on the luck of the draw. 234
22 7 See Arias, 834 F.3d at 833 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment). Compare supra
Part V.A.1 (Professor Harms), with supra Part V.A.2 (Moore).2 28 See supra Part IV.B.1 (Professor Simon-Kerr).
229 See, e.g., Arias, 834 F.3d at 833 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).2 30 See supra Parts V.A. 1 (Professor Harms), and V.A.2 (Moore).
231 See supra Part III.B.1.
232 Compare State v. Major, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (S.C. 1990) (cocaine), with State v.
Harvey, 268 S.E.2d 587, 588 (S.C. 1980) (marijuana).
233 See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2, and IV.B.3 (discussing nineteenth-century
precedents which do, in fact, significantly constrain current moral-turpitude decisions). To
illustrate the extent to which personal morality may affectjudicial moral-turpitude decisions,
one could compare Major, 391 S.E.2d at 237, a case in which a South Carolina court found
cocaine possession to be a turpitudinous crime, with Harvey, 268 S.E.2d at 588, a case in
which a different South Carolina court found marijuana possession to be nonturpitudinous.
234 Compare Major, 391 S.E.2d at 237, with Harvey, 268 S.E.2d at 588.
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Yet, precise bright lines are necessarily somewhat arbitrary.235
Municipalities formulate speed limits with precision. 236 However, few would
pretend that driving twenty-six miles per hour in a residential neighborhood
involves a grave moral wrong, while driving twenty-five miles per hour on the
same street is commendably safe. Instead, governments line draw simply
because lines must be drawn somewhere.237 Experiments with open-ended
speed limits have run into serious problems. 238 As a result, we accept very
particular speed limits, even if they penalize fairly harmless conduct. The
literature criticizing moral turpitude usually discusses the first type of ad hoc
unfairness ad nauseum, and focuses less on what might happen if courts were to
draw moral-turpitude lines too precisely.239 And, although the two concepts laid
235 See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 457 (6th ed. 1901) ("[jUniformity
[in rulemaking] is ... at least highly desirable, in order to maintain effectively such rules of
conduct as are generally-though not universally-expedient. Under this head would come
the exacter definition of the limits of... property in literary compositions and technical
inventions . . . ."); cf Tony Honor6, Responsibility and Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict
Liability, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 574, 580 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 8th ed.
2008) ("The principle involved in imposing ordinary strict liability . . . [means that m]ost of
those held liable will be at fault but a minority will not."). The author is indebted to Erin
Flynn, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ohio Wesleyan University, for making
this more general point (in a class lecture) in reaction to Professor Honord's essay.2 3 6 See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FHWA-SA-12-004, METHODS AND PRACTICES FOR
SETTING SPEED LIMITS: AN INFORMATIONAL REPORT 10 (Apr. 2012) (describing four
practices and methodologies used to establish speed limits).237 See id But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) ("No
person shall operate a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar at a speed greater or less
than is reasonable or proper. . . ." (emphasis added)). This "reasonable rate of speed"
provision governs many instances of possible speeding in Ohio. See, e.g., State v. Neff, 322
N.E.2d 274, 275 (Ohio 1975); 7 OHIO JuR. 3D § 284 (2015). Additionally, for instance,
Columbus does not have a speeding ordinance which renders all violations of posted speed
limits instances of speeding per se. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21(B)(1)-(16)
(containing no mention of a thirty-mile-per-hour speed limit), andCOLuMBus, OHIO TRAFFIC
CODE, § 2133.03(B)(l)-(7) (2009) (containing no mention of a thirty-mile-per-hour speed
limit), with, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps (on file with Ohio State Law
Journal) (search 497 West Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio, use street view function, and view
the north side of West Broad Street) (a thirty-mile-per-hour speed limit sign in Columbus),
and CITY OF COLUMBUS, DEP'T OF DEV., CITY OF COLUMBUS CORPORATE BOUNDARY (Nov.
2013), https://www.columbus.gov/uploadedFiles/ColumbusDepartmentDevelopment/Planning
Division/MapCenter/Columbus%20Corporate%2OBoundary.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2TK-
GPBM] (indicating that said speed limit sign is within city limits). Cf Liberty Woman Pulled
Over for Driving ] Mile over Speed Limit, FOX CAROLINA (Jan. 15, 2016), http//www.foxca
rolina.com/story/30780079/liberty-woman-pulled-over-for-going-1-mph-ver-speed-limit [https//
perma.cc/J454-PUKX] (describing the story of a woman being pulled over by a police officer
for going one-mile-per-hour over the posted speed limit).2 38 See, e.g., Jim Robbins, Montana's Speed Limit of ?? MP.H. Is Overturned as Too
Vague, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1988), http-//www.nytimes.com/1998/12/25/us/montana-s-speed-
limit-of-mph-is-overturned-as-too-vague.html [https://perna.cc/XX32-G8HY].
239 Cf supra Parts IV.B.1 (Professor Simon-Kerr), V.A.1 (Professor Harms), and V.A.2
(Moore).
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out above are not entirely mutually exclusive, many policymaking decisions
involve the balancing of these competing concerns.240
In any enterprise of precise line drawing, one may predict what type of
seemingly undesirable result the rule's arbitrariness will more often cause: a
false positive or a false negative.24 1 In the speeding context, low speed limits
risk penalizing drivers who are driving in a safe manner. This is a false positive.
This must be balanced against the risk of a high speed limit, which might fail to
catch many drivers who are driving at speeds unsafe given road conditions: a
false negative. Of course, line drawing occurs in many contexts, and line
drawers must be sensitive to the policy needs underlying the creation of
standards. 242 In devising screening procedures for cancers, scientists and
physicians want to catch as many instances of actual cancer as possible, with
the concomitant risk that they will detect "cancer" where none exists (a false
positive). 243 So, they draw the "you have cancer" line at a place that risks, if
anything, over diagnosing. On the other hand, in designing police hiring
procedures, law enforcement agencies prefer false negatives;
244 they want to
avoid hiring individuals who will end up "on the front page of the newspaper
and not for good reasons." 24 5
What type of error should we prefer in determining what is a crime
involving moral turpitude? Although the ad hoc breed of moral-turpitude
decisions often come under fire, this area has evolved to become an odd mixture
of bright lines and case-by-case evaluations.24 6 Murder and rape, for instance,
240 See, e.g., Ren6e Paradis, Note, Carpe Demonstratores: Towards a Bright-Line Rule
Governing Seizure in Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 316, 316 (2003) (discussing the relative merits of possible bright-line tests, compared
with more nebulous alternatives in § 1983 claims against police officers for excessive use of
force).
24 1 See, e.g., Darren Boone et al., Patients' & Healthcare Professionals' Values
Regarding True- & False-Positive Diagnosis when Colorectal Cancer Screening by CT
Colonography: Discrete Choice Experiment, Article in PLOS One, PLoS 1 (2013),
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0080767 [https://perma.cc/6NW5-2W9S].
242 See, e.g., Chuck Russo, Demystifying the Background Investigation Process: What
You Can Expect when Applying for a Law Enforcement Job, PUB. SAFETY (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://inpublicsafety.com/2014/02/demystifying-the-background-investigation-process-what-
you-can-expect-when-applying-for-a-law-enforcement-job/ [https://perma.cc/VVW9-42WR]
(discussing law enforcement-recruitment standards).
243 See, e.g., Boone et al., supra note 241, at 1 ("When screening for colorectal cancer,
patients and professionals believe gains in true-positive diagnoses are worth much more than
the negative consequences of a corresponding rise in false-positives.").
244See Russo, supra note 242 (discussing the use of polygraph tests-among other
generally cautious hiring practices-by law enforcement agencies); see also The Truth About
Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph Tests), AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N (Aug. 5, 2004), http://www.apa.
org/research/action/polygraph.aspx [https://perma.cc/38ET-62CP] (discussing reliability
issues with polygraph tests).
245 Russo, supra note 242.
246 See supra Part III and accompanying footnotes.
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are always crimes involving moral turpitude.24 7 These are uncontroversial
bright lines. However, stare decisis has morphed certain less-generalizable
decisions into bright-line rules: aggravated DUI is a crime involving moral
turpitude, while "ordinary" DUI is not.248 Cocaine possession is a crime
involving moral turpitude, while marijuana possession is not.249 Particular
judges have found appreciable differences between the moral import of these
crimes, where others do not see such differences. Additionally, ad hoc decisions
are based on differing standards: Sometimes judges look for scienter, and
sometimes they look to see if a crime is malum in se.250 In any case, these
precedents have calcified into rules that lack a basis in the underlying policy. 2 51
They are-as Judge Posner puts it---"broad categorical rules that sweep in
harmless conduct." 252 The DOJ would be wise to take Judge Posner's advice
seriously and draw bright lines that err on the side of false negatives. This way,
the presence of clear standards will reduce the chances that individual judges
will use their own, personalized moral senses to decide moral-turpitude cases.
To reiterate, in drawing additional boundaries to clarify the content of its
moral-turpitude test, the BIA should mandate that-to be a possible crime
involving moral turpitude-an adjudicator must answer "yes" in response to two
criteria for any given crime:
247 See, e.g., MilijaZivkovic, No. A017-009-761, 2014 WL4966413, at *3 (B.I.A. Aug.
28, 2014) (indicating that both rape and attempted rape are crimes involving moral
turpitude); Applicant, 1998 WL 1990297, at *1 (I.N.S. Nov. 9, 1998) ("Murder is a crime
involving moral turpitude in all cases."); Rivera Pagdn v. Superintendente de la Policia, 135
P.R. Dec. 789, 799 (1994) (indicating that attempted murder is a crime involving moral
turpitude).
248 See, e.g., Lopez-Meza, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1188, 1189, 1196 (B.I.A. 1999).249 Compare State v. Major, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (S.C. 1990) (cocaine), with State v.
Harvey, 268 S.E.2d 587, 588 (S.C. 1990) (marijuana).2 50 See supra Part III.A and accompanying footnotes.2 5 1 See supra Part IV.B (discussing old precedents); cf Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823,834 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) (alluding to the ways in which
current moral-turpitude jurisprudence fails to respond to underlying policy concerns
regarding which noncitizens have committed morally reprehensible crimes). Indeed, in other
contexts, the American government has adapted the term "moral turpitude" to be responsive
to its policy concerns. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM 191 (2017),
http://static.e-publishing.afmil/production/1/af al/publication/afi36-3208/afi36-3208.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F47J-7YVL] [hereinafter AIR FORCE MANUAL]. The Air Force Manual-
perhaps in view of the policies of unit cohesion and discipline-dictates that, for certain
purposes, "offenses involving moral turpitude include . .. sexual perversion, drug addiction,drug use, and drug supplier. . . ." Id.
252Arias, 834 F.3d at 836 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).
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1. Is the mens rea purposely or knowingly?
2. Is it punishable by at least five years in prison? Alternatively, is it a sex
crime; a crime of domestic violence; a violent crime that involves harm
to children, animals, or the elderly; or a hate crime? 253
Together, these factors would avoid sweeping in crimes that are
comparatively innocuous in view of modem ethical norms. While they reflect a
preference for false negatives over positives, the justifications for each of these
factors can be found in threads running through Judge Posner's concurrence, as
well as other criticisms of moral turpitude law.254
D. The BIA Should Use Standards that Accord with Our Modern Moral
Sentiments
These criteria would sweep away the most problematic vestiges of
nineteenth-century moral ideas that plague current moral-turpitude law. First, as
illustrated by the discussion of involuntary manslaughter cases above, these
precedential rules have devolved from being meaningful distinctions related to
reputational harm into exercises in fairly arbitrary nit-picking of mens rea
elements. By drawing a bright line that includes only those crimes committed
purposely or knowingly, courts could ensure that only the most reprehensible
crimes occasion additional immigration penalties via a label of "moral
turpitude." Next, this test substitutes modem moral sensibilities that actually
correspond to reputational harm by penalizing crimes of violence, crimes that
hurt vulnerable victims, or alternatively, crimes that occasion harsh sentences.
1. Moving away from Fraud: Reassessing Mens Rea Requirements
First, for a crime to be considered one of moral turpitude, it must require a
mens rea of purposely or knowingly, or the functional equivalent thereof.
255
253 The author assumes that courts would maintain a "categorical approach" in
answering these questions; for example, courts would only make a finding of "domestic
violence" if a defendant was convicted under an actual domestic violence statute. For
instance, see generally Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Domestic Violence/Domestic
Abuse Definitions and Relationships, NCSL (Jan. 8, 2015), http//www.ncsl.org/research/hum
an-services/domestic-violence-domestic-abuse-definiions-and-relationships.aspx#1 [https//perma.
cc/FYH9-N9EP] (compiling a chart with state provisions regarding domestic violence or
abuse). A possible example of the downside of the categorical approach in this context is
that not all crimes that would, in layman's terms, be considered "domestic violence" are
criminalized as such. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3 1(A)(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2018) (requiring that domestic violence occur against a "family or household member," and
offering a relatively limited definition of such).
254 See, e.g., Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-36 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).
255 Although the influence of the Model Penal Code has significantly reduced the
potential for this to cause confusion, there are still many statutes which take a more
haphazard approach to criminal mens rea requirements. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER,
CRIMINAL LAW 109 (2d ed. 2005) ("[M]any states have adopted portions of the [Model Penal
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This restriction has a simple basis: to ensure that adjudicators do not sweep in
lesser, relatively innocuous offenses because of outdated distinctions that have
been calcified in moral-turpitude precedent. For example, if a judge based a
moral-turpitude determination on the malum in se vs. malum prohibitum
distinction, she might be inclined to view assault as a crime that is malum in
se.256 This makes sense: Legislatures criminalize assault because it is morally
wrong, not because it is simply conduct that we wish to avoid for regulatory
reasons.257 However, Ohio's assault statute dictates that, inter alia, "[n]o person
shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to another .. ."258 The Ohio
Revised Code indicates that "[a] person acts recklessly when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his
conduct is likely to cause a certain result." 259
The following hypothetical illustrates why crimes that are committed
recklessly and are also malum in se pose problems for moral-turpitude law. Say
that Jones is an undergraduate student living in a small dorm room measuring
ten feet by six feet, with one small window facing toward the outside and a desk
nearby. Smith, a friend, wishes to play a prank on Jones, and intends to throw a
Code]."); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (using relatively
precise mens rea definitions, namely "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and
"negligently"); cf, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) (using the mens rea term "willful" in
defining a tax evasion crime). For the purposes of this test, any crime requiring anything
more than "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [a] material
element exists or will result from [an offender's] conduct" would qualify as a functional
equivalent of "purposely" or "knowingly" where none of the terms "purposely,"
"knowingly," "recklessly," or "negligently" are used to denote the required mens rea for the
offense of which an individual was convicted. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)(defining recklessness). For instance, terms like "intentionally" or "willfully" used in the
United States Code would qualify as "functional equivalents" of "purposely" or
"knowingly." Cf, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (using "willful"); DRESSLER, supra at, 403(indicating that, as a mens rea term, "intentional" equates to "purposeful" or "knowing"). An
additional problem arises when statutes are ambiguous about mens rea requirements; indeed,
the Supreme Court has read implicit guilty-mind standards into some laws. See, e.g., Dean
v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 570-72 (2009); see also Paul Larkin et al., The Supreme
Court on Mens Rea: 2008-2015, HERITAGE FOuND. (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-supreme-court-mens-rea-2008-2015# ftn21
[https://perma.cc/CJ46-NWF7] (discussing such statutes generally). In any case-for the sake
of bright-line drawing and preferring false negatives-if a court cannot find by a
preponderance of the evidence that an offense requires something more than recklessness,
the offense should not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. Courts should apply the
Model Penal Code's definition of "recklessness." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).2 56 Cf, e.g., Richard L. Gray, Note, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between
Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1393 (1995)(indicating that some courts and academics find assault to be a crime malum in se).257See, e.g., Antonacci v. State, 504 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)("[A]ssault is malum in se."). But see Gray, supra note 256, at 1393 (indicating that this
claim is not universally supported by judges and academics).
2 58 0OHmo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(B) (LexisNexis 2014).2 59 Id. § 2901.22(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
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rock at Jones's window. One night, seeing Jones sitting at the desk through the
window, Smith decides to act out her plan: She chooses a rather large stone,
hurdles the rock at the glass, shatters the window, and causes injury to Jones's
eye. Smith truly had not considered that the consequences of her youthful prank
could be so serious. However, it seems clear that Smith acted with heedless
indifference to a substantial and unjustifiable risk that physical harm to Jones
would result from this conduct. Thus, because Smith has violated a statute that
lays out a crime which is malum in se, she could be said to have committed a
crime involving moral turpitude, even though this prank is one that-I would
guess-most of us would agree is not among the most significant crimes one
could commit.
2. What Is Worse than Fraud? Violence and Hurting the Vulnerable
Of course, in our collective, modem moral consciousness, mens rea alone
does not determine the severity of a crime. Whereas in the nineteenth century,
violence was once considered a lesser indication of character than dishonesty or
promiscuity, today, Americans' fears regarding crime are largely driven by
violent crime.260 In popular media discussions-and even in academic
literature-"crime" and "violence" are often used synonymously when talking
about public fear.261 As crime rates have decreased in the last twenty years, and
as the public continues to believe that crime is becoming more frequent, a strong
argument can be made that the "if it bleeds, it leads" philosophy of television
2 60 See supra Part IV.B (nineteenth century); cf Mark Warr, Fear of Victimization, PUB.
PERSP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 25, 25, https://ropercenter.comell.edu/public-perspective/1
9 9 3/51.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/K6H7-XRH6] (discussing public fear of crime in the context of violent
crime). Throughout this discussion, the author essentially argues that modem public fear of
violence indicates that the same public finds violence to be morally reprehensible. Although
this is an oversimplification of the discussion, the author acknowledges this inferential leap
in general, and asserts that it is likely not a controversial one. See generally Antti Kauppinen,
Moral Sentimentalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PmL. (Jan. 29, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/moral-sentimentalism [https://perma.cc/6WWL-58JM] (detailing the eponymous
metaethical paradigm which holds that individuals' emotions, such as fear, are key to "the
anatomy of morality").
26 1Kenneth Dowler, Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and
Justice: The Relationship Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police
Effectiveness, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 109, 110 (2003) ("In an early study,
Gerbner . .. hypothesized that heavy viewing of television violence leads to fear rather than
aggression. Gerbner ... find[s] that individuals who watch a large amount of television are
more likely to feel a greater threat from crime . . . ." (emphasis added) (citations omitted));
Public Perception of Crime Remains out of Sync with Reality, Criminologist Contends,
UTNEWS (Nov. 10, 2008), https://news.utexas.edu/2008/11/10/crime [https://perma.cc/WM4M-
EJTN] ("Yet when dramas such as 'CSI' . .. dominate popular television, and crime
coverage often fills a quarter of newspapers, measured perspectives ... are often lost . . . .");
Are We Scaring Ourselves to Death, YouTUBE (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-WmiFShBQDis [https://perma.c/7XRN-JHPA] (ABC television broadcast).
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reporting is to blame.262 The diversion of federal law enforcement resources
away from white-collar crime towards antiterrorism efforts, and the public's
general view of blue-collar crime as less socially acceptable, both support the
same view: whether right, wrong, or indifferent, Americans today see violence
as a more serious type of crime. 263
As a result, the second of the proposed necessary conditions above asks,inter alia, if an offense involves violence. If we want the government's moral-
turpitude judgments to line up with our actual moral sensibilities, drawing lines
in a way that emphasizes violent crime is a necessary first step. However, even
within the universe of violence, there are key distinctions that cannot be lost.
After all, the media drives public fear of violent crime by covering very serious
felonies, such as rape and murder;264 on the other hand, two intoxicated patrons
262See, e.g., Alyssa Davis, In US., Concern About Crime Climbs to 15-Year High,
GALLUP (Apr. 6, 2016), http//www.gallup.com/pollI90475/amnericans-concern-crime-climbs-
year-high.aspx [https://perma.ce/Y5PA-TRY6] (discussing public fear of crime); Alan
Neuhauser, US. Crime Rate Rises Slightly, Remains Near 20-Year Low, U.S. NEws AND
WORLD REPORT (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-26/us-crime-
rate-rises-slightly-remains-near-20-year-low (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (discussing
a decrease in the overall crime rate); Adam Saeler, Unreality TV: The Media and Crime
Rates, 3 CIVIC COLUMN 1, 2-3 (2011), http://www.civicinstitute.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploa
ds/2011/07/Civic-Column-Summer-2011.pdf [https*/perma.cc/8ZGV-RQCB]; cf Charles M.
Blow, Crime, Bias and Statistics, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
09/08/opinion/charles-blow-crime-bias-and-statistics.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal)("Many media outlets reinforce the public's racial misconceptions about crime by presenting
African-Americans and Latinos differently than whites . . . ."); Truth vs. Perception ofCrime
Rates for Immigrants (PBS television broadcast July 10, 2015), http-//www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/truth-vs-perception-crine-rates-immigrants/ [https*//perma.ccIV9E7-LALJ] (stating that public
perception does not match data in recent annual crime report). See generally Deborah Serani,
IfIt Bleeds, It Leads: Understanding Fear-Based Media, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 7, 2011),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/two-takes-depression/201106/if-it-bleeds-it-leads-
understanding-fear-based-media [https://perma.cc/2RNB-HKXB] (describing media crime
reporting generally, as well as its potential psychological effects at an individual level).2 6 3 See GENNARO F. VITo & JEFFREY R. MAAHS, CRIMINOLOGY 351 (4th ed. 2017)(noting that "little attention is given" to many white-collar crimes); Stuart P. Green &
Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime Culpability: Bribery, Perjury,
and Fraud, 75 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34-35 (2012) (discussing less-serious treatment
of white-collar crime in many cases); Joseph P. Martinez, Unpunished Criminals: The Social
Acceptability of White Collar Crimes in America 5, 21, 40 (Apr. 11, 2014) (unpublished
senior honors thesis, Eastern Michigan University), http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&context-honors (on file with Ohio State Law Journal)
("When the subject of criminal activity is brought to conversation, frequently our minds
begin to consider the various forms of street crimes whose effect are very visible and
immediate. Perhaps this is because the risk of serious bodily harm is much greater when
comparing a strong-arm robbery to a financial scam conducted in the business place.");
Terrorism, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism
[https://perma.cc/2SVD-UJBP] ("Protecting the United States from terrorist attacks is the
FBI's number one priority.").2 64 See Serani, supra note 262 (detailing media practices that emphasize very violent
crimes).
584 [Vol. 79:3
585A NEW DEFINTION OF "MORAL TURPITUDE"
punching each other at the bar, while violent, tends not to be newsworthy. 265
Yet, assaults between feuding males make up a disproportionate number of
violent crimes relative to the media coverage they receive.266 Society takes other
categories of crime more seriously: One need only compare media reaction to
football players injuring intimate partners with media reaction to football
players punching one another.267 Of course, crimes that modem Americans
consider most serious cannot be limited to domestic violence: sex crimes, hate
crimes, and crimes with other vulnerable victims make intuitive candidates.
268
26 5 Compare Melissa Jeltsen, Horrific Footage of Ray Rice Punching Then-Fiancle
Released, HUFFPOST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2014/09/08/ray-rice-
punch-video n 5783380.html [https://perma.cc/4EJT-8S8H] (describing a notorious case,
which received a great deal of media coverage, in which an NFL player punched his then-
fiancee on video in a casino elevator), with The Sports Xchange, Denver Broncos Coach
Breaks Up Locker Room Fight Between Offense, Defense, UPI (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.upi.com/SportsNews/NFL/2016/12/19/Denver-Broncos-coach-breaks-up-locker-
room-fight-between-offense-defense/2101482179611/ [https-/permacc/P3D7-X8KF] (describing
a relatively less newsworthy event in which NFL players were involved in a locker-room
altercation).
266 Compare Jeltsen, supra note 265, with The Sports Xchange, supra note 265.
267 See, e.g., Bill Landis, Hear the 911 Call from Bri'onte Dunn's Girlfriend Alleging
Former Ohio State RB Hit and Choked Her, CLEVELAND.COM (July 20, 2016),
http://www.cleveland.com/osu/ 2 016/07/hear the_911 call from_brionte.html [https://perma.cc/
TP73-832E] (athlete and domestic violence); Ebenezer Samuel, Cowboys Rookie Ezekiel
Elliott Accused of Beating Ex-GF, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 23, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/cowboys-rookie-ezekiel-elliott-accused-beating-
woman-article-1.27216 4 1 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (athlete and domestic
violence). Compare Jeltsen, supra note 265, with The Sports Xchange, supra note 265.
2 68 Sex crimes are considered especially heinous in American society. See Law & Order
SVU: No Surrender (NBC television broadcast Feb. 22, 2017) (containing an opening
sequence which asserts that sex crimes are especially heinous). But see Holly Henderson,
Note, Feminism, Foucault, and Rape: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, 22
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 225, 225-26 (2007) (describing philosopher Michel
Foucault's position, expressed in the 1970s, that rape should be punished no more severely
than assault). See generally Olive Travers, Community Treatment of Sex Offenders, 50
FURROW 387, 387 (1999) (describing negative attitudes towards sex offenders in society).
Attitudes toward child abuse and domestic violence might be described similarly. See
MONICA L. MCCOY & STEFANIE M. KEEN, CILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 5-7 (2d ed. 2014)
(discussing increasingly harsh attitudes toward child abuse since the enlightenment); Jane
Martinson, The Laudable Drive To Change Attitudes Towards Violence Against Women,
GUARDIAN (July 23, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/1ifeandstyle/the-womens-blog-with-
jane-martinson/2012/jul/23/attitudes-domestic-violence-women [https://perma.cc/928S-MQ9N]
(discussing more recent changes in attitudes toward domestic violence). The proliferation of
hate-crime statutes in modern times suggests that Americans consider hate crimes to be
exceptionally reprehensible. See Scott Phillips & Ryken Grattet, Judicial Rhetoric, Meaning-
Making, and the Institutionalization of Hate Crime Law, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 567, 572
(2000) ("[B]y 1995 two-thirds of U.S. states had enacted hate crime laws . . . ." (citations
omitted)); Hate Crime Laws, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/crt/hate-crime-
laws [https://perma.cc/33YH-9QJU] (detailing the history of federal hate-crime legislation
since 1968). Crimes against the elderly have received similar treatment. See J. Vincent Aprile
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Although this list may not be comprehensive, keeping these extremely offensive
acts within the bounds of moral turpitude makes sense based on all of the
available information describing our society's moral sensibilities. Or, put
differently, among crimes with relatively lower sentences, these offenses should
not be excluded as possible crimes involving moral turpitude.
3. Our Conceptions ofBaseness and Depravity are Connected to
Sentencing Standards
By asking whether the crime is punishable by five years or more in prison,
or alternatively a crime of violence with a vulnerable victim, the "punishable
by five years or more in prison" prong of the moral turpitude test above manages
to accomplish one thing: It excludes misdemeanors and low-level felonies that
are nonviolent or do not involve an exceptionally vulnerable victim. 269 This
II, Defending the Elderly, 27 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at 55, reprinted in GPSOLO,Sept./Oct. 2012, at 70, 70 ("The criminal justice system has begun to recognize the need to
prosecute vigorously cases of elder abuse ... ."); Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures,
Financial Crimes Against the Elderly 2013 Legislation, NCSL (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fmancial-services-and-cmmerce/financial-crimes-against-the-
elderly-2013-legis.aspx [https://perma.cc/7CAU-RS4WJ ("In the 2013 legislative session, 29
states and the District of Columbia had legislation to address financial crimes and
exploitation against the elderly and other vulnerable adults."). Society also increasingly
recognizes that abuse of animals is not only morally reprehensible, but often foreshadows
abuse of humans by the same offenders. See generally Clifton P. Flynn, Why Family
Professionals Can No Longer Ignore Violence Toward Animals, 49 FAM. REL. 87, 87 (2000)(arguing that family scholars and professionals need to address animal abuse because of its
"disturbing nature" and "negative consequences for both people and animals").269 Many accuse the American criminal justice system of treating various other
categories of crime with undue harshness. See, e.g., ELIZABETH LINCOLN, INTERNATIONAL
DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, THE UNITED STATES RETHINKS DRACONIAN DRUG SENTENCING
POLICIES, 1 (Jan. 2015) (criticizing American drug laws); Brian Mann, The Drug Laws That
Changed How We Punish, NPR (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the
-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish (on file with Ohio State Law Journal); Mark
Memmott, Holder Decries "Draconian Mandatory Minimum Sentences," NPR (Aug. 12,
2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/201.3/08/12/211291336/timely-idea-holder-to-
pitch-changes-to-drug-enforcement [https-/pemacc/LUX6-YELC]; cf Arias v. Lynch, 834
F.3d 823, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the civil
penalty of deportation as harsh relative to an offense that inhered in the defendant's
undocumented entry into the United States). These include drugs laws and laws related to
undocumented migration. See Arias, 834 F.3d at 833-34 (Posner, J., concurring in thejudgment) (undocumented worker); LINCOLN, supra, at I (drug laws). Importantly, in many
cases, the United States Code's lowest level, "simple possession" drug offenses are
punishable by less than five years in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). Similarly, those
like Arias who use a false social security number cannot be punished by more than five years
in prison without aggravating circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)-(8). Additionally, illegal
entry into the United States is not punishable by more than two years in prison, and lacks an
explicit mens rea requirement under most circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). As a result, the
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criterion rests on the assumption that today, our moral sentiments are connected
to sentencing standards. 270 Indeed, when one begins discussing more serious
offenses, ethical lines may blur. Perhaps a defendant has been convicted of drug
trafficking, but we can be sure that he was associated with a broader, violent
criminal enterprise. Perhaps a drug dealer never struck, stabbed, or shot his
customers, but instead gave them strong opiates that lead to their overdose
deaths. Or, in other cases, an ambitious Ponzi schemer may have defrauded
investors of billions of dollars, causing many to lose their entire life savings.
Each of these crimes run afoul of modern moral sensibilities, and might still be
considered a twenty-first-century crime involving moral turpitude. 271
E. Courts Should Uphold Such a Redefinition by the DOJ
The majority of circuits apply Chevron deference to the BIA's decisions
regarding whether a given crime involves moral turpitude.
272 While other
two factors outlined here already eliminate these crimes as possible crimes involving moral
turpitude.2 70 Nineteenth-century Americans could not have conceived of the particularity of
today's sentencing guidelines. Cf, e.g., Adam Davidson, Comment, Learning from History
in Changing Times: Taking Account of Evolving Marjuana Laws in Federal Sentencing, 83
U. CHI. L. REv. 2105, 2107-08 (2016) ("The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the
United States Sentencing Commission to establish a uniform system of 'sentencing policies
and practices' by implementing 'detailed' federal sentencing guidelines for judges to follow.
The pre-Guidelines sentencing regime affordedjudges wide discretion." (citations omitted)).
271 See, e.g., Beth Burger, Justice Insider: Judge Pines for Short North Posse Days When
Murder Wasn't Priority, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.dispatch.com/news/
20170404/justice-insider-judge-pines-for-short-north-posse-days-when-murder-wasnt-priority
[https://perma.cc/SD6X-AHL7] (describing negative reactions to a Columbus gang involved
in both drug trafficking and a number of murders); Josh Sanburn, Heroin Is Being Laced
with a Terrifying New Substance: What To Know About Carfentanil, TIME (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://time.com/4485792/heroin-carfentanil-drugs-ohio/ [https://perma.cc/KQF8-ND7C]
(describing opiate overdose deaths); Kyle Smith, Wait a Minute-Why Should I Hate Bernie
Madoff?, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/2011/02/08/bemie-madoff-ponzi-
scheme-social-security-opinions-contributors-kyle-smith.htnl [https://perma.cc/WM66-L75K]
(suggesting that the author is extremely unusual for not "hating" infamous Ponzi schemer
Bernie Madoff).
2 72 See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004). Courts treat the question of
how, procedurally, to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude differently from
the question of whether a given crime involves moral turpitude. See, e.g., Jean-Louis v.
Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462, 477 (3d Cir. 2009). In Jean-Louis, the DOJ supported its
Silva-Trevino I standard by arguing, inter alia, that "crime" and "involving moral turpitude"
could be understood as "distinct grammatical units." Id. The Third Circuit rejected this,
indicating that the phrase is unambiguous (under a Chevron rubric) insofar as it constitutes
a single term of art. Id. In contrast, in Prudencio v. Holder the Fourth Circuit came to a
similar conclusion regarding this argument, but declined to extend the DOJ Chevron
deference with respect to its determinations of how to examine questions of moral turpitude
from a procedural standpoint. Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 485 (4th Cir. 2012). See
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circuits apply a varied mosaic of standards on this question without invoking
Chevron, the DOJ would have strong arguments that this redefinition of moral
turpitude is consistent with either Skidmore deference, or even a modified de
novo review. 273 Although a change in the definition of a crime involving moral
turpitude by the BIA might occasion a resolution of this circuit split on an
important issue, just as importantly, many of the same reasons undergird the
arguments that the DOJ might make to different circuits.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, like many others, reviews these
questions under the Chevron rubric.274 In applying Chevron, courts must first
ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 275
However, if a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue,"
courts must ask if an agency's interpretation is reasonable.276 In the context of
moral turpitude in the Seventh Circuit, the court has stated that (1) the term
"crimes involving moral turpitude" in the INA is ambiguous, and (2) the BIA is
entitled to Chevron deference with respect to its interpretation of the term. 277
For many of the reasons that Judge Posner discusses, this Note's definition is
reasonable.
The Ninth Circuit might apply Skidmore deference in resolving whether a
change in the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is permissible. In
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, the court held that Skidmore deference is
appropriate when the BIA deviates from its own precedents in deciding whether
a particular crime involves moral turpitude.278 Skidmore deference entails
evaluating an agency's interpretation of a statute based on its degree of care, its
consistency, formality, relative expertness, and the persuasiveness of the
agency's position.279 Here, the DOJ has an opportunity to present a revision of
moral turpitude that, though purposefully inconsistent with prior doctrine, is
created carefully and persuasively, and ought to be applied formally.
The Fifth Circuit would apply a modified de novo review in this context.280
In Smalley v. Ashcroft, the court outlined its general approach as according
"'substantial deference to the BIA's interpretation of the INA' and its definition
of the phrase 'moral turpitude.' 28 1 However, the Fifth Circuit reviews "de novo
generally Chaffin, supra note 25, at 505-06 (stating that Chevron deference to the BIA is
not universal).273 Knapik, 384 F.3d at 87-88 (mentioning multiple review standards).274 Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008).
275 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); see
also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)("Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.").276 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.2 77 Ali, 521 F.3d at 739.27 8 Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).27 9 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
280 Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2003).
2 81,Id.
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whether the elements ofa ... crime fit the BIA's definition." 282 Thus, although
the Fifth Circuit's approach could accurately be characterized as a de novo
review, its deference on the question of defining "moral turpitude" in the first
place should allow for the DOJ to argue meaningfully for a revised meaning.
Under any of these deference schemes, courts should uphold a reasoned
redefinition of what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. For one thing,
any reader would be hard-pressed to find judicial decisions that praise the BIA's
current interpretation.283 Importantly, this change would vindicate the
judiciary's own relentless, vigorous criticisms of moral-turpitude law. 284 This
marks the revised definition as both reasonable under Chevron, and persuasive
under Skidmore. The change, in a general sense, would also find a great deal of
support from academic literature.285 Moreover, at least one court has suggested
that moral-turpitude standards, in the first place, were meant to change over
time.286 The definition of moral turpitude also shifts across policy contexts: the
Air Force defines crimes involving moral turpitude as "includ[ing] . . . sexual
perversion, drug addiction, drug use, and drug suppl[ying]. "287 And, the basic
definition of "moral turpitude" remains unchanged: conduct which is "bas[e],
vil[e], or deprav[ed]." 288 Since courts today seem to render decisions that run
counter to this definition, an agency reinterpretation is appropriate. 289 Chevron,
Skidmore, and other schemes of judicial deference should not pose an obstacle
to the BIA in adopting an interpretation of "crimes involving moral turpitude"
that is congruent with modern ethical norms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Moral-turpitude law presents unique difficulties. Each branch of our
government must grapple with its outmoded, haphazard rules in one way or
another.290 Congress may be unlikely to act, since providing a definition which
lists specific crimes as unworthy of deportation might make for biting television
ads come campaign season. 291 The courts, left with no guidance from the
282Id at 336.
283 See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830-36 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J.,
concurring in the judgment); cf supra Parts V.A.1, V.A.2.
284See, e.g., Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-36 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).
285 See supra Parts V.A.1, V.A.2.
2 86 Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. 522, 524 (1853) (indicating, in a nineteenth-century case, that
moral turpitude standards are "necessarily adaptive," in the sense that they ought to evolve
over time).2 8 7 AIR FORCE MANUAL, supra note 251, at 191.
288 Moral Turpitude, supra note 27.
289Cf, e.g., Arias, 834 F.3d at 830-36 (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment).
290 Cf supra Parts V.A.1, V.A.2.
2 9 1 Cf DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS, 1952-2004 111 (4th ed. 2005) ("An analysis . . . demonstrates that advertising
significantly affected voters' rating of several policy problems . . . ."); Jeffrey W. Koch,
Campaign Advertisements'Impact on Voter Certainty and Knowledge ofHouse Candidates'
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legislature and little from the Supreme Court, can only apply precedent as best
it can be determined to maintain judicial impartiality. 292 When that body of
precedent itself depends on a mixture of nineteenth century honor-culture norms
and decades-old decisions, moral-turpitude law is rife with instances of square
pegs being pounded into round holes. 293 In many ways, the BIA is stuck in the
middle. It is constrained by the definition of "conviction" in the INA, and
frustrated by a fractured judiciary. 294 The BIA should take advantage of thejudicial deference it receives, and the concomitant recognition that it may-
within reason-reinterpret statutes in light of policy goals. By excluding low-
level, nonviolent crime, and by fixing a fine point on the mens rea required for
a finding of moral turpitude, it can move the law in a positive direction.
Ideological Positions, 61 POL. RES. Q. 609, 609 (2008) ("Evidence . .. indicates that the
more negative issue advertisements were broadcast, the more confident citizens became that
they knew the targeted candidate's ideological position."); Niraj Chokshi, How Judicial
Campaign Ads May Be Affecting Legal Decisions, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpostcom/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/10/22/how-judicial-campaign-ads-may-
be-affecting-legal-decisions/iutm term-.f2f540d0f877 [https//permacc/5523-UT92] (providing
anecdotal evidence that elected officials' behavior may be influenced by attack ads); Jose A.
DelReal, Trump, in First Attack Ad, Accuses Cruz of Immigration Flip-Flop, WASH. POST(Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/post-politics/wp/2O16/01/22/rump-in-
first-attack-ad-accuses-cruz-of-immiigration-flip-flop/?utmterm=.3280824cO9b6 [https://permacc
/Y5PA-TRY6] (describing a fairly recent example of an immigration-oriented attack ad).29 2 See supra Part V.
293 See supra Parts 1II, IV.
2 94 See supra Parts II.B and III.B.
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